Many environmentalists like Aldo Leopold and Holmes Rolston III criticize as unecological the emphasis those animal liberationists like Peter Singer place on preventing animal suffering. Their argument holds that animal liberationists must regard predation as bad by extending the role of moral consideration to include things that do not feel pain or pleasure. The view that Leopold and Rolston hold maintain that like the natural system of the animal world ( humans and non-human animals ), the eco systems of the land (including soil, plants, and all animals) is highly debatable and should be taken into moral consideration. This paper disputes the latter view by arguing that the c

apacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all.

The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interest at all. If a thing has interests, and has the ability to suffer then it ought to be taken into moral consideration. It would be absurd to speak of the interest of rocks, plants, and mountains, because they have no ability to experience pain or pleasure. Animals have emotions and desires, and appear to be capable of enjoying a good life. Every sentient creature is capable of leading a happy or less miserable life, and hence it ought to be given moral consideration. Rolston argues that much of the natural world that should be protected is non-sentient and so deserves moral consideration and be regarded as intrinsically valuable. In my view, non-sentient natural objects can be rightly valued because of what they are and not just because of the ends they serve ( intrinsically valuable ) and even if they are not the sort of things we could have duties to ( morally considerable ).

Environmental philosophers have been eager to point out, however, that suffering is quite prevalent in wild nature, and if it is always to be considered a morally significant disvalue then we must have responsibilities for the well being of other animals as opposed to hunting. On the contrary, if a recreational hunter does not kill, he will not starve, he will not likely even go hungry because he has alternative means of a livelihood, so the benefit of killing an animal is far less significant to a recreational hunter ( The greatest good for the greatest number ). As Flanagan argues, “There is much evidence that the human species has been omnivorous fro

Some topics in this essay:
Gary Constock, Rolston III, , Leopold Rolston, Peter Singer, moral consideration, nervous system, capacity suffering enjoying, ought moral consideration, Holmes Rolston, nervous system jellyfish, holmes rolston iii, animal suffering, pain pleasure, feel pain, suffering enjoying prerequisite, capable suffering, holmes rolston, ought moral, animal liberationists, rolston iii,