This essay will examine the political objectives of the Iraqi government in the lead up to the invasion of Kuwait and afterwards and the political objectives of the US- led coalition assembled to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In addition it will examine the United States policy aims with regard to Iraq before the war and the extent to which these were achieved. The essay will demonstrate that Iraqi policy decisions did massive harm to Iraq and were instrumental in bringing about significant internal strife for Iraq after the war. Furthermore, the essay will demonstrate that a broad coalition with limited political consensus must limit its military objectives. This limitation means that coalition is unlikely to be as effective as a policy tool for any individual state as unilateral action might be. It will also demonstrate that while American led action in the Gulf was motivated by a desire to free Kuwait in great part, it was also a demonstration of the power of international consensus in the changed security environment of 1990.

Any analysis of the post Desert Storm situation in Iraq demonstrates that the use of force in invading Kuwait proved disastrous for Iraq if not for its leader. After swift, devastating and conclusive defeat in the field, his troops withdrew. In the north and south of Iraq, Kurds and Shiite Arabs rose up, with the tacit approval of the United States but these rebellions were savagely put down by Hussein’s government. The humanitarian crisis caused UN troops to deploy into Turkey and Northern Iraq under UN Resolution 688 to protect Kurds. In the South, Basra, Najaf and Karbala were subject to savage reprisal and the Marsh Arabs severely oppressed. Perhaps worst of all for Iraq, Saddam clung onto power and his uncompromising stance with the West lead to years of punitive UN sanctions, reduced revenue, widespread deprivation and coercive military strikes. Saddam’s most valuable military asset, the Republican Guard, was largely intact and he used it to oppress dissenters, retaining his grip on the country. His own personal position strengthened, as despite losing the war, he was able to portray himself as the great defender of his nation, through expert media manipulation and a very powerful security apparatus.

John Simpson noted a famous statement by Tam Dalyell that ‘if Kuwait had been famous for its carrots, the US would not have lifted its proverbial finger.’ While this may be true, it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein would have pushed his territorial claims so far in pursuit of that crop. Iraq in 1990 was economically ravaged by war with Iran and over $80bn in debt. Recent Kuwaiti oil production had exceeded OPEC production quotas. This surfeit of oil had depressed oil prices from $22 per barrel in January to $13 per barrel in the spring of 1990, leading to a reduction in revenue for Iraq from her own oil sales. As Iraq, unlike Kuwait, was so dependent on oil this led to real domestic pressure on Saddam who noted in May 1990 that the Kuwaiti overproduction was ‘a kind of war against Iraq.’ In July 1990 he further raised the pressure accusing Kuwait and UAE of pushing a poisoned dagger into the back of Iraq. Iraq’s desperate financial position had been helped in the past by loans and gifts from other Gulf states, including Kuwait, and Iraq felt Kuwait had a moral duty to repay Iraq for protecting her during the Iran- Iraq War. Access to funds was vital to reform Iraq’s ailing economy and ease domestic pressure.

While turning up the level of rhetoric against his neighbours, Saddam also began to deploy large numbers of troops to the Kuwaiti border, attempting to intimidate Kuwait into helping him financially. This build up was regarded by many as simple sabre rattling and the thought of one Arab attacking another Arab nation was unthinkable in the Middle East. The then American ambassador spelt out the United States view to Iraq, April Glaspie when she allegedly informed Saddam on 25 July 1990 that the United States had ‘no opinion on Arab – Arab conflicts, like your border dispute with Kuwait’. As the build up continued and became real preparation for invasion, Saddam used bluff and lies to assure Kuwait that they were safe from invasion. A disastrous meeting between Kuwaiti and Iraqi officials at Jeddah on 31 Jul 1990 broke up in acrimony and insults and two days later Iraq attacked Kuwait.

Matthews’s book identifies four political phases of the crisis, each of them tenser than

Some topics in this essay:
Kuwait Iraqi, United Nations, Iraqi Perspectives, Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein, UN Resolution, Middle East, UN Saddam’s, April Glaspie, Recent Kuwaiti, political objectives, united nations, un resolution, peace security, broad coalition, january 1991, iraqi forces, invasion kuwait, iraq withdraw, august 1990, 15 january 1991, peace security region, 1991 gulf war, un resolution 678, iraqi forces kuwait,