mortal: this is a deductive argument.

David Hume furthers this distinction in what is known as his 'coincidence thesis'. He distinguishes between 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact'. Mathematical truths would be classified as 'relations of ideas', or 'a proposition the negation of which does not entail a contradiction'. A 'matter of fact' on the other hand, may be defined as 'a true proposition the truth of which is not determined solely by the meanings of the terms in which it is expresed.' Relations of ideas are necessarily true or (logically necessary); a matter of fact, on the other hand, will be contingently true. The epistemological distinction philosophers draw between a priori (prior to experience) knowledge and a posteriori (after experience) knowledge, Hume states coincide with relations of ideas and matters of fact directly. So according to the Coincidence thesis, a proposition which counts as a relation of ideas may be known only a priori , i.e. independently of experience; while a proposition which (if true) counts as a matter of fact may be known only a posteriori, i.e. by experience. As induction is based on experience, its conclusions will be contingently true, and that for Hume is not knowledge.

From these examples it is easy to see why Hume discredits inductive reasoning. They all presuppose the future will be like the past, and that is a very dodgy assumption indeed. Hume argues that we are just conditioned to think the future will be like the past, that when we make these assumption we just give way to a pattern of psychological conditioning as we have been hard-wired to do so. We could argue with Hume that we no longer rely merely on enumerative induction in science, we do not only hold the future will be like the past, we can explain the planets revolved around the by scientific background, and this is what makes the sun 'appear' to rise. At first it may seem hypothesis may usurp pure enumeration, but we are still no nearer to resolving the issue as scientist still rely on the presumption that objects have time-enduring properties. Scientists can come up with a mathematically sophisticated theory to explain why the planets revolve around the sun but they still presuppose the future will be like the past.

Also some philosophers see this as being too harsh upon induction, they argue we do not make observations in a void. We tend to relate one experience to another experience. We look at the terms in which the evidence is described and the pattern stated and see how these have fitted together in previous cases of induction. For instance I may make an observation of the sun rising each day, and relate that to my experience of a natural pattern of inference such as 'objects left alone tend to remain in existence and change few of their characteristics etc.' and 'the sun has such a property' to infer from that, that it is probable the sun will also rise tomorrow. From such natural laws we cannot deduce something indubitable, but they do help select the hypothesis to be supported by the inference from those which it does not support. One can still have knowledge of things and their causal properties, and from this knowledge still assert a degree of certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow. From my findings I have concluded that there are two basic rules of induction; it must go from the right kind of data to the right kind of generalization. As

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David Hume, Furthermore Popper, , CG Hempels, Karl Popper, Robin Taylor's, A's B's, sun rise, Suppose Popperian, sun rise tomorrow, inductive arguments, rise tomorrow, future past, 'the sun, philosophy books, ravens black, library scribbles, premises true, enumerative induction, form library scribbles, philosophy books form, mortal' 'socrates man', 'all mortal' 'socrates,