What to do after 9/11
As the bi-polar world collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. emerged confused and unclear of how to operate in an environment largely malleable to its hegemonic will. Ambiguity and lack of a clear mission suddenly replaced the ideological clarity the Red threat had provided for foreign policy makers in the cold-war era. Rather than reassessing the security environment within the radically new framework it required, in the face of uncertainty, Washington fell back on what was familiar. With globalization continually bringing the human community into greater contact and superceding state boundaries, the security paradigm nonetheless remained focused on the traditional inter-state and great power conflict. History weighed heavy in the minds of pundits in this new analysis, seeing as power is inevitably brought into balance and ultimately upset; all empires eventually collapse. Policy in this period under both Bush and Clinton largely reflected these fears, pursuing the status quo whenever possible. With a few notable exceptions, the goal was to avoid directly threatening existing regimes, preventing them from balancing against such a threat. In the presence of an overwhelming military and economic dominance, n
Presidents are unlikely to adopt soft power strategies b/c the benefits are far off into the future and may jeopardize short term election prospects ‡ this is why a distinct moment in history such as the fall of communism (harder to do because it isn’t one specific incident…unfolds after several year) or 9/11 are necessary to adopt such a policy Great powers are inevitably balanced against. While such a statement held just as much validity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the source and ease with which such a counterbalance could emerge was largely overlooked. Certainly China, and possibly even Russia may one day be able to challenge the economic and conventional military might of the U.S., and such threats needed to be taken into account. However, the over-emphasis on the threat of rogue states, largely as a substitute for the real threat of both individuals and networks of terrorists, is symbolic of the failure to recognize and inability to deal with such threats in the context of current military policy and tactics. When one extremist can plant a dirty bomb at little cost and with relative ease in a commercial center, wreaking enormous psychological and commercial havoc, or use America’s own aircraft to take down two of its greatest symbols of prosperity and killing thousands of its civilians, how can one create an appropriate military response? It cannot be done with military means alone, and retribution may prove ultimately unachievable; herein lays the dilemma. o state would dare challenge or balance against the U.S., especially if they faced no provocation. (No threat to balance against…as opposed to pure balance of power theory. Site Walt(?) for evidence). However, the status quo mentality provided little incentive for long-term bandwagoning either. Allies could be easily bought in short-term, convenient circumstances, but a deeper allegiance to American ideology, values and presence in the global arena was rarely established. Compounding the problem was an overwhelming inattentiveness to the human community at the sub-state and individual level.
Some topics in this essay:
Cold War,
Al Qaeda,
Soviet Union,
Site Walt,
Jeb Bush,
Bush Clinton,
Radical Islamists,
George Bush,
foreign policy,
Qaeda Bush‡,
Qaeda Clinton‡,
al qaeda,
human community,
deter al qaeda,
security environment,
threat picture,
deter al,
soviet threat,
short term,
transformative power,
didn’t deter al,
soviet threat picture,
soft power,
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Approximate Word count = 2113
Approximate Pages = 8 (250 words per page double spaced)
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