The individual transformation roadmaps being pursued by each service have the right combination of core competency, evolutionary capability and risk. One cannot just snap one’s fingers and have a transformed force. There are too many uncertainties in the future security environment and the threat and the accompanying vulnerabilities and challenges for there to be a clear roadmap to the transformed force. One would not petition to transform a force to face a snapshot of today’s threat any more than one would petition a transformed force to face a guesstimate of the unknown threat. Either extreme poses too great a risk.

This short piece does not design the next forces but will outline a force planning construct which maintains core competencies to address known (more assumed) threats and challenges while hedging evolutionarily toward the unknown (less assumed) threats. This force would maintain the capabil

The U.S. Army and USMC would also continue their current roadmaps. They similarly concentrate on core competencies with a vision toward an evolutionary growth. They are grouped here together because they would similarly grow more alike while maintaining their identity. The USA would become more expeditionary while the USMC would grow in its ability to sustain itself for a more prolonged period. The U.S. Army cannot field a lighter, faster, stronger force tomorrow any more than it can come to grips with what that force should look like. That being said, the USA would move toward lighter, faster and stronger. The Stryker road and its rapid deployment capability is a good one for this construct. It may not be lighter, but the lessons learned in seeking to deploy a brigade in 96 hours and a division in 5 days will provide insight on changes to the future roadmap without accepting too much risk. The question of “how many divisions?” is burning and the unknown security environment precludes any drastic assumptions. Thus, a status quo is warranted and no changes to force manning would be made.

Lastly, SOF forces would also strike to balance the core competencies with a hedge toward the unknown. SOF’s current roadmap of a larger force would focus on the missions of CT, CP and DA. The graying of SOF would grow into other mission areas such as recon and theater security cooperation (training and engaging other forces).

ity to defeat an adversary in a MTW as well as a regional conflict.

As a hedge toward future scenarios, the UCAV would receive additional money. This nascent platform is a perfect example of something one can see a future for but not clearly enough to bet the farm on. One can easily picture the need for an unmanned vehicle that can loiter for many hours and deliver precision fires, but the unmanned platform linked into a network-centric architecture has too many risks to receiv

Some topics in this essay:
, Army USMC, CVN’s DDG’s, UCAV’s JSF, JSF UAV, CP DA, B-52’s B-2’s, South Korea, Battle Experiments, Missile Defense, core competencies, core competency evolutionary, transformed force, conventional strike, legacy platforms, platforms evolutionary, security environment, core competency, competency evolutionary, evolutionary capability, legacy platforms evolutionary, service combination core, future security, combination core competency, competency evolutionary capability,