Watergate vs. Iran-Contra: A Comparison of Two Scandals

Watergate and Iran-Contra are two of the most publicized scandals of all time. In Watergate, President Nixon bowed to extreme public pressure and a probability of an impeachment vote against him, and resigned (McNeely-Johnson, United States v. Nixon, 252). In the Iran-Contra scandal, President Reagan escaped any impeachment charges claiming he was ‘uninformed’ (Hurwitz et. al., Presidential Support During Iran-Contra, 360). This paper will attempt to examine the context and surrounding events in which independent counsel investigations were undertaken in both the Reagan and Nixon administrations. We will first examine the reasons and authority for investigation. Next we will attempt to explain the results of the investigations: dealing first with Watergate, then Iran-Contra. Finally we will determine the effect of Iran-Contra and Watergate on the presidency and society as a whole. Before looking at the effects of the aforementioned scandals, it is necessary for one to first know the reasons for investigating in the first place.

Part I: Reasons and Authority for Investigations

A: Leading to the Investigation of Iran-Contra

The Senate Watergate Committee began with much public support and an eagerness to determine the details of the Watergate break in and the cover-up. The hearings began on May 17, 1973 with four Democrats and three Republicans assigned to it. The committee was about to interrogate 63 witnesses in 53 days (Ervin, 124,128). Even before the trial began, it was clear what the White House strategy was going to be in the investigation: pure stonewalling. Nixon’s plan was to seem publicly helpful to the committee, but privately show no cooperation (Ervin, 24). He refused early on to let any of his current, or past staff, be called to testify before the committee, calling on executive privilege as justification (Ervin, 32). Senator Ervin, the chair of the committee, lashed back at Nixon saying that the committee should issue subpoena’s and hold the President’s aides in contempt of congress, if they did not comply with the committee’s request (Ervin, 36). In March, before Sam Dash (chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee), James McCord, a member of CREEP , a Nixon aide, and one of the men caught in the Watergate, testified that John Dean III and Jeb Magruder had prior knowledge of the Watergate mission. This was significant because Magruder was the former deputy director of CREEP and Dean was a legal aide to Nixon (Knappman, 25). Dean was of particular importance because his testimony, if truthful would do much damage to the President, due largely to Nixon’s close working relationship with Dean throughout the scandal (Edwin, 38). In an effort to clear himself from Watergate, on April 30th., Nixon decided to clean house. The administration announced that Dean and three others were either fired or resigned. Those three were White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, and domestic policy expert John Ehrlichman (Greenblatt, 2152). Early in May, Dean and Magruder were both given use immunity in order to compel them to testify before the Senate Committee (Ervin, 114). Dean and Magruder both agreed to testify. John Dean, began what would be the most compelling testimony of anyone in Watergate on June 25 (Ervin, 38). Dean testified that John Mitchell (former Attorney General for Nixon and chair of the Committee to Re-elect the President), and Magruder were both involved from the start. He went on to say that “he was in reality, merely a messenger who obeyed the instructions of Haldeman and Ehrlichman.” (Ervin, 163) Dean also testified about Nixon’s enemy list where he vowed to punish those on the list who at one time or another crossed his path (Greenblatt, 2152). Haldeman and Ehrlichman began testifying one right after the other on July 24. They both testified virtually the exact same thing: that they did not know about the Watergate break in until after it happened, that they did not participate in the cover-up, that President Nixon had no knowledge of Watergate, and that Dean was to blame for not informing them. They also testified in response to the inquiry that they had taken money from the Nixon re-election campaign and given it as hush money to the original Watergate defendants that were standing trial at the time. Both of them responded that they gave aid to the defendants as a gesture of humanitarian aid to help with a fair trial (Ervin, 189-90). On July 13, Alexander Butterfield testified. Butterfield, a longtime aid to the President, revealed that the President had been taping conversations and meetings that went on in the Oval Office, and that it was Butterfield’s job to make sure that this operation ran smoothly (McNeely-Johnson, 264). Immediately following the testimony of Butterfield, the Watergate Committee began to demand the tapes. Before going into any further explanation about the tapes, it will first be necessary to go back to the grand jury investigation being overseen by the Special Prosecutor’s Office, and show how that ultimately play

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