Book I of Rousseau’s The Social Contract stresses that this contract will sustain

The focus of Rousseau’s theory of Sovereignty that offers the most difficulty is his view that, for every State, a Legislator is necessary (Book II: VII). We shall understand the section only by realizing that the legislator is, in fact, in Rousseau’s system, the spirit of institutions personified; his place, in a developed society, is taken by the whole complex of social custom, organization and tradition that has grown up with the State. This is made clearer by the fact that the legislator is not to exercise legislative power; he is merely to submit his suggestions for popular approval. Thus Rousseau recognizes that, in the case of institutions and traditions as elsewhere, will, and not force, is the basis of the State. This may be seen in his treatment of law as a whole, in which he defines laws as “acts of the general will,” and, agreeing with Montesquieu in making law the “condition of civil association,” goes beyond him only in tracing it more definitely to its origin in an act of will (Book II: VI). The Social Contract renders law necessary, and at the same time makes it quite clear that laws can proceed only from the body of citizens who have constituted the State. “Doubtless,” says Rousseau, “there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual. Humbly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men” (Book II: VI). Of the law, which set up among men this reign of mutual justice, the General Will is the source.

liberty and/or freedom more efficiently than the state of nature, thus, paving the way for lawful and sound political power. Rousseau says that lawful political power does not exist in nature. Instead, political power becomes legitimate by the formation of contracts built between the members of society. The only legitimate political authority found in nature is that of the authority that a father holds over his child. Rousseau then compares this father-child relationship to that of a ruler and his people (or one of his subjects). The ruler would have to use force, however, as seen in slavery, to direct his subject. The use of force is not natural. Therefore, agreement would have to be the only legitimate means by which political authority would be permissible. “Might does not create right,” explains Rousseau (Book I: III 173). If might produces right, then the people obey their rulers because they are forced to do so, not because they ought to. In a society run by force, what Rousseau terms as “slavery,” there is no room for freedom. Without agreement, one’s actions would have no moral significance. Only in a fair trade, of freedom for promotion of the general will, is man able to use reason and, thus, apply morality to his/her actions. Only when the people are restrained by their own desire to reflect among one another, as a whole, and form an agreement, and only where they have the freedom to do so, can a state attain the capability to uphold the freedom of its people.

By strict enforcement of the guidelines that will allow land occupancy by an individual and/or individuals grouped together, even in cases where they divide the land amongst themselves, the sovereign holds precedence over the rights of its people. The sovereign is the real owner of the land, just as it is the equal and undivided voice of its citizens. In Book II, Rousseau will first explain the inalienable status of the sovereign, the body of people that are “the true foundation on which all Societies rest” and then the laws that help to maintain the loyalty of its subjects (Book I: V 179).

Rousseau, after upholding the State’s absolute supremacy, goes on to speak of “the limits of the sovereign power” (Book II: IV). Rousseau sees clearly that it is impossible to place any limits upon the power of the State; when the people combine into a State, they must in the end submit to be guided in al

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