Successful Sanctions Require Cooperations

The use of sanctions has become increasingly common over time, especially as the threat of war has become progr

Economic sanctions are not the only international issue where establishing credibility and collaboration is critical to success. Another example that has recently received a lot of media limelight is international and domestic terrorism. Terrorism is an attempt to influence state leaders through the intimidation of third parties (Gleditsch 14 March 2002). The threat of terrorism is particularly frightening because it is usually used against non-military targets and can happen anywhere and at anytime. The costs of terrorism can be reduced “by taking retaliatory action against terrorist organizations and the countries that sponsor them” (Lee 22). However, in order for this retaliation to be fully effective, much like in economic sanctions, there must be a cooperative response from all victimized states. Reducing the threat of terrorism is a public good and its benefits cannot be kept from a state even if they chose not to cooperate. Though the states that do retaliate gain the most profound results from their efforts, even states that have never been hit be terrorist activities receive benefits. Free riding hampers combating terrorism much in the same way that it affects economic sanctions, however, when dealing with terrorism organizing states must also fight paid-riding.

I believe that economic sanctions can be an effective means to solving international disputes peacefully. All international issues from economics to global terrorism prevention rely on cooperation and the coordination of interstate efforts. As is the case with the environment, we cannot count on a symmetrical pattern of state interest to drive the cooperation needed to make economic sanctions successful. There are always outside incentives and the ability to free ride pulling possible sanctioners away from the leading sender’s cause. Countersanctions and side-payments are tools that leading senders can use to gain multilateral support. I believe that if states employ the tactics of increasing audience costs, enlisting the use of international institutions and building coalitions of support behind there cause that economic sanctions could become very useful tools in international conflict resolution. Through enhanced credibility states will be able to elicit more cooperation from fellow states and it is truly through cooperation that the strength of economic sanctions will be revealed.

Audience costs can also be achieved at the international level. One way for a leading sender to achieve this is by bringing international institutions into the conflict (Martin 416). Threats or promises that are made within an institution carry increased credibility because there are usually established audience costs that the state will receive if they rescind their pledges. Secondly, involving international institutions and achieving the support of its members for their economic sanction demands the use of many political and economic resources, which in itself increases the cost that the leading sender will bear if they decide to change course. Rooting yourself in your convictions and leaving yourself very little room to back out can best achieve credibility. By tying themselves into international institutions the state is reducing the possible incentives they may have in the future to reverse their policies. States are also making changing these plans in the future more difficult even if they are enticed or coaxed. Formal agreements, such as the ones formulated in international institutions, provide possible allies with more reliable information about the leading sender’s intentions, because they clearly involve the state’s reputation. Formal agreements provide higher audience costs than simple threats or promises, because the commitment is public and involves more actors than a bilateral communication.

Paid-riding occurs when a state offers a terrorist group a safe haven in return for assurances that they will not participate in t

Some topics in this essay:
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