On the ride over, Lee passed by one of his generals, William Wofford, who jubilantly reported his near success in reaching the crest of Cemetery Ridge on July 2nd. However, when Lee confronted him with the idea of a second attack on that day, Wofford’s mood drastically changed when he replied “the enemy [has] had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy, and the situation now is very different. ” Lee disregarded the advice of his general despite the fact that Wofford had been closer to the action, a sign of overconfidence. He revealed the root of that when he impatiently told Longstreet that he had overcome similar odds, a reference to a victory at Chancellorsville . Lee furthers showed his overconfidence in his careless choices of units for Pickett’s Charge. He curiously did not choose to utilize several relatively fresh brigades and instead used devastated brigades like General Alfred Scales’, a unit that had already lost its commander along with having every field officer but one dead or wounded . To make matters worse for Lee, Union General Meade had anticipated his point of attack in the center by the simple reasoning that Lee had previously attacked both flanks . When Lee inspected his lines and noticed numerous officers missing he finally began to feel doubt, but he eliminated any reservation with the faulty reasoning that “the attack must succeed. ”

It is impossible to know exactly when Lee decided to have Pickett’s troops launch their massive attack, but it is clear that he had the attack roughly planned at least a day in advance. Lee revealed his crucial future move by purposefully withholding Pickett’s troops from the carnage they would have otherwise endured on July 2 . He did this to save them for an ultimate attempt to break through the Union line, his purpose all along . Additionally, Lee assumed that the Federal Army’s near disaster (from his perspective) in the first two days had hurt its morale, and boosted that of his own men . He was proven wrong later that afternoon when the Union soldiers put forth a valiant and inspired effort.

Despite the daunting task of marching into enemy fire, many men from both sides recalled their Cause and the odds at stake; if the South won, the “United States” would become an oxymoron and if the North won, the Confederacy would cease to exist . Union Major General Winfield Hancock further inspired his soldiers in one of the most heroic acts in a battle marked by heroism. He rode along his lines with the II Corps flag unfurled behind him. Although remarkably risky, his brave act calmed his men and reassured them that their commander was not unnerved. When one of his men suggested he shouldn’t risk his life like that he simply smiled and replied, “There are times when a corps commander’s life does not count. ”

Before the attack began, Lee and Longstreet rode northward for an inspection of the terrain and the units selected to cross it. Lee dictated his plan of attack to Longstreet, stressing that Pickett’s newly arrived division would form the center of the attacking line. To Pickett’s right, General Cadmus Wilcox and Colonel William Perry led brigades under General Richard Anderson’s division. To Pickett’s left, General

Some topics in this essay:
Virginia Pennsylvania, Confederate Army, Northern Virginia, Ridge Longstreet, Cemetery Hill, Battle Gettysburg, James Longstreet, Ridge July, Lincoln South, II Corps, pickett’s charge, union line, july 2nd, union soldiers, ” lee, battle gettysburg, union army, break union line, army northern, northern virginia, “the enemy, army northern virginia, july 2nd lee,