Before the war, British government only considered of the specific problems not general because almost one century that British never involved in war before WWI. British did not think that war would an effect on the foreign trade and the foreign exchanges. In August 1914 almost everyone expected that the war would be over quickly, including Herbert Asquith the prime minister. He adopted the slogan ‘Business as Usual’. He wanted to convince the British people that the war could be fought without disturbing life in Britain. Initially most people expected a short war and saw no need to change norm

For helping the British farmer, the Food Production Department of the Board of Agriculture assigned and allocated scarce fertilizer and equipment and it supplied workers. Several thousand tractors were sent out but the distribution of land between pasture and the different crops reverted rapidly to the pre-war proportions and the crops of 1924-8 bore a remarkable similarity to the crops grown in 1909-13. Under the Corn Production Act of 1917, the plough policy of 1917 and 1918 were to be valid for six years, and it had been accomplished by essential powers given to the Board of Agriculture on the one hand, and by a minimum price guarantee for wheat, oats and potatoes. In coal mining, after a decline of 11% of output in the first year of war, more complex system of control with price control and export licensing was built in 1915 and end in 1918.

Besides, another major problem for British in WWI was the lack of food supply. At the outburst of war, Britain imported from overseas eighty percents of the cereals consumed, forty percents of the meat, and three-quarters of the fruit, besides all the sugar and colonial products and substantial proportions of other foodstuffs. Towards the end of 1916, shipping losses and a poor harvest in North America gave awareness to the need to increase home food supply. For 1918, 3 million acres more than in 1916 were ploughed up, and compared with the average harvests of 1904-13, the wheat production increased 1.02 millions tons and 2.63 million tons for potatoes in 1918. This was achieved at the cost of reducing the grassland by 3.5 millions acres and decreasing the home output of milk and meat.

No precise estimate can be framed in pounds, shillings, and pence of the losses experienced by the people of Britain through their participation in the Great War. One of the worst, and certainly the most tragic-the death or maiming of the flower of youth and manhood-is obviously incalculable. No one can measure the consequences to thousands of companies and business firms resulting from this gap in the succession of those who would have taken their place in the direction of capital and labour, to say nothing of the fine mechanics and artisans and sturdy labourers, who fell at the very outset of their careers.

Some topics in this essay:
Profit Duty, Securities Scheme’, Munitions Act, War Bonds, Lloyd George, Agreement March, Chancellor Exchequer, Surplus Deficit, Board Agriculture, North America, real wages, direct taxes, income tax, treasury agreement march, trade unions, august 1914, food supply, system control, expected short, war quickly, board agriculture, agreement march 1915,