Fundamentally the success of government depends upon its ability to administer public policy and exercise authority. British government throughout this entire period failed to fulfil this role, in spite of adopting two very contrasting approaches. Primarily, a policy of distinct commercial self-interest between 1714-1740 representative of Walpolian government, through the means of mercantile trade i.e. Molasses Act 1733, heavily neglected political responsibilities. Non-enforcement of trade taxes such as the Navigation Acts, contributed to the rise of the colonial assemblies who in turn built upon their own political rights and ultimately prevented the British government from asserting any constructive policy. The Board of Trade from 1740 onwards attempted to regain the initiative through a new approach of active policy making but drastically failed to provide cohesion. Sudden switches to imperialism no longer suited the colonies, which had increasingly been influenced by the progressively democratising and empowered assemblies. Therefore in terms of successful diplomacy little differed between George I (1

In retrospect Britain for the majority of the period did not understand the importance of what the colonial assemblies were doing and simply neglected them in favour of protecting metropolitan trade. Twenty-five years of negligence towards the imperial administration, particularly on Newcastle’s part, proved detrimental and extensively weakened the strict controls the Board of Trade and Royal Governors should have assumed. Allowing trade that suited non-intervention to dominate policy, directly jeopardised political control by permitting the colonial elite to undermine their Royal Governors and for smuggling to take place. British inaction for such sustained period is solely responsible for triggering the representative assemblies to seize an increased share of power. The lack of reaction to the displacement of governors throughout the 1740s, is evidence that power had drastically slipped from the grasp and still very little was done for over a decade. The arrival of much stronger imperial policy came far too late with Halifax’s ascendancy in 1752, for parliament still perceived the colonists to be loyal subordinate tenants. Continual over estimation for their control of the relationship, meant affectively they became the subsidiary side. They never instigated action first but were left to react to the assemblies’ actions. Without governors in firm control, parliament lost an understanding of the situation and the political phenomena surrounding the rise of the assemblies. Even with the removal of their fierce imperial rivals France from North America, The Seven Years War ironically confirms their stark decline in power over the colonies at the end of this period. Ultimately the longstanding approach of neglect accompanied by sudden spells of intervention, reveals how little Britain did seek to govern the colonies and why they were so unsuccessful in the era preceding the outbreak of the American Revolution.

The limited war effort displayed by the colonies during the physical confrontation of the Seven Years 1756-1763, the fourth in a world-wide series of conflicts over the supremacy of North America, revealed just how little authority British government now held at the end of George II reign. Regardless of Britain’s attempts to protect the colonies against the oppressive French, the disappointment at the colonist’s unenthusiastic behaviour greatly escalated the cracks in their relationship. Continued smuggling with the French boosted their enemy with vital supplies. In particular Pennsylvanian ships clearly defied trade laws participating in the transhipment from British to French Vessels in a number of main ports therefore unnecessarily prolonging the war. The colonial militia was also despondent as their lack of quality and quantity was met with stark criticism from General Wolfe, “The most contemptible cowardly dogs…there is no depending on them in action.” Notably even with substantial military forces present British control could not be re-established. Furthermore, blatant disregard of the Quartering Act, requiring British Redcoats to be housed and fed, and the emergence of ‘Provincial Particularism,’ assemblies only sanctioning militia in their own regions, confirmed the erosion of imperial control.

Only the threat to economic gains by smuggling awoke British complacency, triggering a new directed interventionist policy that simultaneously proved how policy was financially orientated. While this corresponds with the installation of Henr

Some topics in this essay:
Royal Governors, Colonial Assemblies, Molasses Act, King Britain, Plan Union’, Seven War, Board Trade, Stuart Kings, Imperial Policy’, Navigation Acts, british government, colonial assemblies, board trade, colonial elite, seven war, political control, eighteenth century, rise colonial assemblies, governing colonies, war effort, original charters, britain seek govern, authority british government,