Britain's Policies on Fissile Materials: The Next Steps
Plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) are the essential 'fissile materials' used in nuclear weapons. Since 1945, about 3,000 tonnes of these materials have been produced world-wide, of which some 2,000 tonnes (1,760 tonnes of HEU and 230 tonnes of plutonium) have been produced for military purposes and 1,000 tonnes (almost entirely plutonium) have arisen within the civilian fuel-cycle. The regulation of fissile materials now occupies a central place in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, any act of nuclear disarmament, as events in Iraq and South Africa have recently shown, must entail the meticulous recording and verification of all fissile materials acquired by the country in question. To be plausible, a project of global disarmament would therefore hinge upon the ability and willingness of all nation states to reveal their material inventories, submit them and associated production facilities to rigorous international verification, and dispose of residual stocks. As the summary table shows, Britain holds substantial inventories of fissile materials, particularly as a consequence of its long involvement in civil reprocessing. Its policies will affect significantly, and
DounreayAll civil facilities & materialsYesNot designatedVulcan naval research facilityNoNo enriched uranium are so plentiful, and their prices are so low, plutonium cannot compete as a reactor fuel in normal circumstances. Furthermore, it was once believed that the separation of waste products, and the concentration of the most radioactive materials in relatively small volumes of 'high-level wastes' (HLW), through reprocessing would greatly ease the task of waste disposal. This has not turned out to be the case. Reprocessing increases rather than decreases the volumes of waste material requiring disposal; the underground space required for the disposition of HLW is little different from that required by unreprocessed spent fuel; and reprocessing leaves behind a contaminated plant which is difficult and costly to disassemble. Source: David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, SIPRI, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997), Table 3.13. 2.3 Tritium acquisition for weapons Because so little is known about HEU acquisitions from the US, the estimated quantity of HEU acquired by the UK carries an especially large error margin. If the quantities that are now held by the UK amount to less than 10 tonnes, the excess over requirements for both weapons and submarine reactor fuelling may be slight. If the quantities exceed 10 tonnes, Britain could probably safely declare an excess.
Some topics in this essay:
Sciences NAS,
Aldermaston Burghfield,
Germany Japan,
HEU UK,
Press Oxford,
Calder Hall,
Defence Agreement,
Hall Chapelcross,
Ministry Defence,
France China,
fissile materials,
international safeguards,
spent fuel,
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weapon-grade plutonium,
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iaea safeguards,
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peaceful nuclear activities,
plutonium highly enriched,
held store sellafield,
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Approximate Word count = 14040
Approximate Pages = 56 (250 words per page double spaced)
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