Was the food production campaign of the Second World War mor

The wartime policies for agriculture were in many ways similar in both conflicts. The difference lay in the extent of forward planning and the speed with which the policies were implemented. Both campaigns involved a switch from livestock to arable with the ploughing up of pastures to make way for the additional crops. In 1915 the Milner Commission recommended the move toward arable and suggested a series of subsides and price guarantees to encourage farmers to make the transition (Perren, 1995: 31). However the government, worried by the cost and unconcerned by the threat, rejected these proposals. At the outbreak of the war the President of the Board of Agriculture saw ‘

At the outbreak of both the First and Second World Wars the dominant source of power in British agriculture were horses. In 1914 there were over a million working horses in British agriculture (Dewey, 1991: 246). By 1939 the number had fallen to 549000 yet they still provided the majority of power to British farms (Martin, 2000: 17). The major alternative source of power was tractors. However in 1914 the stock of tractors in Britain was negligible (Dewey, 1975: 109). In 1939, 37 years after the first tractor had been produced in Britain, the numbers still only stood at 56000 (Martin, 2000:17). For the food production campaigns to be successful the government needed to ensure an adequate supply of horsepower to British agriculture. Any shortages would hamper the ploughing up policy and risk the success of the campaigns. At the start of the First World War the government appeared slow to act. Before the outbreak of hostilities no positive steps had been taken to increase the stock, either of horses or tractors, for a ploughing up campaign. In 1914 and 1915 the number of horses in agriculture fell by 70000 as demand from the army increased (Dewey, 1991: 246). By the time the government responded the horse had already, quite literally, bolted. The introduction of the Sales of Horses Order in June 1917 prevented the sale of farm horses without a licence (Sheail, 1976:112). However this action, almost three years after the start of the war, came too late and it’s effectiveness is questionable. The evidence from Norfolk shows that the act may have made little difference to the situation. The Norfolk committee granted 8500 licenses and refused just 35 applications (Sheail, 1976:112). Although the need for a license may well have been a sufficient deterrent to farmers wishing to sell horses the fact that so few licences were refused suggests the impact of the legislation was slight. Positive action was taken by the Food Production Department to increase the numbers of horses for the ploughing up campaign. 30000 horses, along with the men and equipment to work them, were made available too hire through the county committees. However, as we have already seen, the impact of this was lessened by a shortage of skilled labour to work the fields (Sheail, 1976: 112-113). To compound these problems further, the limited funds available to the purchasing officers, meant that the horses provided were often too old, sick or weak for the work required (Sheail, 1976: 113).

Tractors did play a part during the First World War although their role was minor in comparison to horses. By mid 1918 there were just 8000 tractors in Britain of which 4500 were government machines (Dewey, 1991: 247). With tractors, it was the private sector that led the way and increasing numbers was not an objective of the government early in the war. When the government did respond with orders from the US in 1917 the delivery of the machines was often late limiting the impact they could make. So with tractors, as with horses, the government did takes steps to increase supplies but these actions were reacting to shortages rather than any thought out advance planning. Dewey demonstrates this well when comparing pre-war and wartime horsepower levels. Wartime horsepower was below the 1909-13 levels in every year bar 1918 (Dewey, 1991: 247). When you take into consideration that, with the ploughing up of grassland, the need for horsepower was greater than before the war then this could be considered a failure of the first production campaign. Again, drawing from the experience of the First World War, the preparations for securing enough horsepower for agriculture in the second war were well advanced by 1939. A survey completed in 1937 estimated that tractors were only used to half their capacity but these were mostly in the south and up to an additional 4500 machines were needed in the North and Wales (Martin, 2000: 34). Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, the Minister of Agriculture and

Some topics in this essay:
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