Hiroshima DBQ
After Germany’s surrender on May 7, 1945, the U.S. was able to focus efforts entirely on Japan, the country that had originally spurred its involvement in the war. Up to the use of the first atomic bomb, America had been steadily tightening its grip around Japan. Massive firebomb raids on Tokyo in March of 1945 left over 250,000 buildings destroyed and killed an estimated 83,000 people. General MacArther had conquered the Philippines in July of that year and the Japanese navy had been decimated by the three- day battle at Leyte Gulf. But weakened Japan still did not appear willing to surrender unconditionally. The use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima certainly had the intention of forcing Japan’s unconditional surrender and it was used with the hope of winning the war before getting help from the Soviet Union. But there is little evidence to suggest that using the atomic bomb on Hiroshima carried any sort of intent to frighten the USSR. The atomic bomb provided the means of ending the war with as little effort and as little risk to American solders as possible. “Here then was a speedy end to the Second World War,” were British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s thoughts after receiving news on the readine
ss of the bomb. As of the middle of July 1945, it was estimated that the Japanese Army still had five million men. Even though victory seemed likely for the U.S., the questions of when and at what cost were still unknown. Japan had demonstrated in the past a willingness to fight to the bitter end. No doubt thoughts of Iwa Jima were in the mind of Secretary of War Stimson when he said that “the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft ….” At Iwa Jima, out of a Japanese force of 22,000, only 500 would surrender, just over 2%. Imagine five million solders with that same fortitude. It’s not surprising that Stimson estimated that “the major fighting would not end until the later part of 1946” and that “such an operation might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone.” From this document it appears that the U.S. military was prepared to fight the long hard battle for victory over Japan. Why then wouldn’t they fight the short, easy battle when presented with that option? Fewer casualties were not the only reason the U.S. desired a quick end to the war. “It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan.” These are the words of Churchill in July of 1945, after the atomic bomb was confirmed to work. The time when the U.S. did desire Russian participation was in February at the Yalta Conference. The atomic bomb had not yet been tested, and Washington strategists expected heavy Amer
Some topics in this essay:
Jima Japanese,
James Byrnes,
Hiroshima August,
Soviet Union,
Soviet Union’s,
Leyte Gulf,
DBQ Germany’s,
Cold War,
China July,
War Stimson,
atomic bomb,
bomb hiroshima,
atomic bomb hiroshima,
july 1945,
iwa jima,
soviet union,
desire russian,
russia manageable,
secretary war,
russian participation,
1945 meeting,
desire russian participation,
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Approximate Word count = 1083
Approximate Pages = 4 (250 words per page double spaced)
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