Deep-rooted hostility towards the Asian minority community has long been tolerated in Canada. All levels of government have at one time or another enforced laws, which have discriminated against Orientals (Ward 459). It was this intolerance and xenophobia, which lead to the internment of both Japanese aliens and Canadian citizens alike. The pressure to intern the Japanese began years before war broke out between Canada and Japan. This pressure came from the British Columbia public out of an irrational fear of the unknown. It was based on rumor, preconceptions and stereotypes about the Japanese people. There was little if any justification for such resentment in reality. There is an abundance of evidence, which indicates Canadian authorities including Prime Minister King did not believe that the Japanese presence on the British Columbia cost did not constitute a direct threat. If it had not been for the huge public outcry the Japanese would never have been interned (Ward 458). This point is best illustrated by King’s continual delaying tactics and continual avoidance of the Japanese problem. It was never King’s wish to intern the Japanese. However, the potential for civil unrest and violence towards the Asian community left King with few options.

King feared that the escalating violence against the Japanese community might instigate a retaliatory response against Canadian POWs. King was also well aware that his handling of the situation could directly affect British interests in the Pacific (Ward463). King had to balance the fears of west coast nativists with the prospect of aggravating Japan. King created a special committee to examine the question of the Japanese Canadians and internal security. The committee found that anti-Japanese sentiment was the real danger to the community not Japanese subversives.

W. Peter Ward, “British Columbia and the Japanese Invasion,” in Jeff Keshen, ed., The Making of Canada- Reading Kit (Ottawa, 2002), p.

Despite all evidence, to the contrary British Columbian nativists refused to be pacified and as a result on February 24 1942 because of the growing public unrest and fears of Japanese retaliation against Canadian POWs King capitulated and approved the total evacuation of the Japanese from the costal areas. Men, women, children, aliens and citizens alike were brought inland to silence the violent outcry of British Columbian xenophobes.

The authors first criticize Canada for its lack of reliable intelligence capabilities. It is the authors’ contention that the lack of Canadian intelligence resources was responsible for the lack of evidence against the Japanese. This is self-serving reasoning reminiscent of the Spanish inquisition. It is a supposition devoid of reason. It is based upon assumptions and hearsay. It is not in anyway a reliable argument. Although there is evidence, which indicates one government agency's intelligence service was ineffective, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that they were all so poorly equipped. (Johnson and Granatstein 105). No evidence is provided to account for their assumption that the RCMP, army, navy, or RCAP suffered from the same incompetence. The authors assertion that “there is no reason to believe that the army, navy or air force by 1941 were any less c

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