some of us in the U.S. government, and I presume in the Soviet government as well, were

thinking ahead to the future. For example, I had argued for a tough stand on the removal of the

missiles and the bombers, but also for movement toward a reduction in tensions after resolution

of the crisis. In the memoranda of October 25 and 27, I suggested that the United States should,

"while solving the Cuban base question with determination, forcefully reaffirm its readiness to

reach agreements on arms control and disarmament" and other broader diplomatic arrangements

(Appendix documents B and C). Those doves who argued most strongly for seeking to resolve

the crisis through diplomatic means sought not only to find matching concessions, but also to

use the occasion to advance a more far-reaching political agenda. By contrast, most hawks

opposed any move toward a d*©tente. There were, however, also those, including myself, who

favored a tough stand on the question of removal of the offensive weapons, but also hoped that

official statement of a commitment not to invade Cuba after the highly conditional statement by

had a conversation with the new president on November 29, 1963. In Mikoyan's view,

As the action officer in the Department of State on such matters during most of the 1960s, I

must be prepared to deal with and defuse any crises that may, despite our best efforts, occur.

and Johnson administrations. 255

or newly activated, validity. As earlier noted, the United States had never issued any public or

relations (and Soviet-Cuban relations, and indirectly other developments not reviewed here), but

any war involving the United States and the Soviet Union, are of the highest priority.

Some topics in this essay:
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