Lieber, Robert J. 1992. “Oil and Power After the Gulf War.” International Security. Volume 17 No. 1, summer 1992.

The Arab oil weapon since that date has remained unused in any coherent form. This is due to a number of differing factors, some of which have had more effect than others. Undoubtedly the most important is the interdependence with the world economy that the Arab economies found themselves inextricably linked to. This soon became clear to Arab states. However, it came sooner to some than others, with a confrontation at an OPEC conference in Doha at the end of 1976 being a watershed with the Saudi government refusing to increase prices, - “Saudi policy at Doha stemmed from a hard-headed realizations that the health of the OPEC economies is linked to that of the Western economies, and inflation caused by oil prices rebounds on the OPEC members”. The Arab states are now more than ever dependent on their oil revenue, with huge debts, like Saudi Arabia’s $62 Billion to service they literally cannot afford to play political games when their economies are in such dire need of capital. While economies have

Some topics in this essay:
Middle East, , Saudi Arabia’s, Gulf Crisis, Arabia Arab, Security Volume, Palestinians Israel, middle east, World War, East Report, Licklider Roy, oil weapon, middle east north, conventional wisdom, 1973 regards, east north, 1992 “oil, arab oil, oil prices, arab economies, world economy, arab oil weapon,