Personal Identity

One of the most deeply contemplated questions that philosophy has asked is where a person’s identity comes from. Identity is truly the fundamental quality of a human being. A philosopher can immortalize himself by discovering a solid answer to the question. Many times, hypothetical situations or scenarios (some more realistic then others) are brought up to help prove or disprove a view. In some cases, they serve merely as ‘brain fuel’. They help to promote constructive and profound thinking on the subject. The case of having one’s body and brain completely replaced with different materials while maintaining the exact memories brings up some heated issues.
In John Perry’s “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality”, Perry uses the characters Miller and Cohen to advance the point that the new being is the same person. They argue by way of the Memory Theory. Let’s assume that I am an advocate of the Memory Theory temporarily. If I am ever in the situation described I will take the transporter because I believe that the person who survives will be me. This is true because I will have all of the same memories as I did before. The fact that my memories constitute my identity can be

The first part of Weirob’s argument is appealing to me because it shows that the person who arrived on Earth didn’t actually have the experiences that I did. The person merely seemed to have the memories. The next part is not nearly as appetizing. I don’t buy this argument because, in my opinion, it is somewhat of a copout. It seems as though whenever Weirob confronts an identity theory, she refutes it by bringing up a hypothetical situation in which there are two beings with the same factor (whatever the theory is suggesting as the source of identity). The argument is merely bringing up a case that can deny any identity theory. For example, when she confronts the Brain Theory, she refutes it by bringing up a situation when two identical brains are constructed.

Perry next uses the character Weirob to argue against the Memory Theory. Weirob would argue against the conclusion by saying that a preservation of memories does not lead to a preservation of self. She would say that I hadn’t survived and that the person on Earth was someone who only seemed to remember my experiences. Since the new being on Earth had not actually been there to receive the memories, it actually isn’t me. I would thus not be around to anticipate the later experiences. She would bring up the example of heavenly bodies. If God creates a heavenly body with certain memories, God can certainly create two. If these two bodies have the same exact memories, then, according to the Memory Theory, they must have the same identity. This is, of course, absurd because identity implies oneness. Since the Memory Theory is shown to be absurd, so is the idea that I will survive merely because my memories survived.

n be shown in several ways. First off, I have memories of myself that are completely unique from memories of other people. For instance, if I remember being on a roller coaster with a friend, I can remember the actual feelings of intense fear and exhilaration that I had during the ride