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WW2

On frequent occasions since the decline of Spain as Europe's principal power, that country has become a thorn in the side of the two other great powers on the Atlantic, France and Britain: Napoleon described the Peninsular War as his "greatest mistake" and the Quadruple Alliance of the 1830's saw Spanish difficulties shatter the Anglo-French entente. Indeed, France's greatest military humiliation in 1870 was provoked by a dispute with Prussia over Spanish succession. Little wonder then that in August 1936 both France and Britain sought a haven in a policy of non-intervention when the Officers rebellion in Spain became a civil war.

`Anglo-French non-intervention ultimately proved little more than a confession of weakness which left Spain with a Fascist dictatorship for nearly forty years, but the reasons for the policy, which most countries agreed to but only a handful adhered to, were more complex than a purely historical reaction to the Spanish problem. In practice, French policy was to mirror British policy in many ways but the rationale and the goals of the two allies were rather different. Much controversy surrounds whether Leon Blum was bullied into the policy of non-intervention or not; I am unable to contribute further to


`For France the main issue remained as ever her security but at the same time she was well aware of the fact that she "was the pivot around which the hopes of the Spanish Republic turned". (6) Whilst the Fronte Populaire and the Frente Popular were not exactly equal (the French version contained ironically more communists in August 1936) there was clearly a community of interest between the two. French non-intervention is more difficult to evaluate.

`As already mentioned there is some controversy over whether Eden or Baldwin forced Blum to change his mind over intervention. Whether this is true or not what is undoubtedly the case is that the French would have been made aware of British concerns regarding Italy and Germany and that these concerns, since they impacted very heavily on French security interests, would have been persuasive to the Quai D' Orsay. French security rested entirely upon the Locarno agreements so Paris was just as keen as London to prevent a widening of the Spanish dispute which might threaten the renegotiation of those agreements.

`There was also an economic angle to Britain's involvement in Spain which made it difficult for the Government to sponsor an ongoing conflict. In 1935 there was forty million pounds worth of British investment in Spain (3), mostly in ore mining, textiles and sherry; and the two governments had just arranged a payment schedule for the £6 million of foreign debt owed by Spain to Britain. At the outset of the conflict, in which the Falangist Rebellion had cleared failed, it was believed that without foreign intervention the unrest would soon fade away. However, even when the conflict persisted with German, Italian and Soviet aid, the Foreign Office saw no reason to get involved. It was believed that whichever side emerged as victors would look favourably upon Britain for not having contributed to the death of any Spaniard. As Eden himself said in Parliament "intervention in Spain is not only bad humanity, it is bad politics." (4) This appears a very duplicitous approach but this was how British interests were perceived and as Stone rightly points out "lacking any emotional ties with the Spanish Republican Government the British could pursue non-intervention with much less bad conscience than the French." (5) Hence economics and the position of British investors led Britain away from Intervention in the hope that Spain would one day be grateful.

`British Foreign Policy in the 1930's is often summed up by one word: appeasement. Though this is chiefly remembered because of Chamberlain's attitude towards Germany and Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938, the general trend of trying to reduce the international consequences of small disputes and maintain the peaceful balance was evident in Eden's policy towards Spain in August 1936. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and in March 1936, the German militarization of the Rhineland were certainly of significance to the Foreign Office since both these right wing Nationalist governments were sympathetic towards Franco, so heavy British intervention on behalf of the Republic

Some topics in this essay:
Conservative Party, Italy Germany, August Europe, Foreign Office, European War, War Blum, Spanish Republic, Adams Non-Intervention, Spain Fascist, Foreign Policy, non-intervention agreement, civil war, french security, august 1936, france britain, republican government, spanish republic, european war, italy germany, multilateral non-intervention, spanish civil war, multilateral non-intervention agreement,

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Approximate Word count = 2078
Approximate Pages = 8 (250 words per page double spaced)


  

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