Trying To Put One Label on Two Ideas: Functionalism’s Failure as a Monist Theory

Functionalism is defined as an inherently monist theory of the mind. Functionalism rejects classic dualism due to the interaction problem (Pojman 1998). Functionalists believe that we will be able to understand the brain on the nature of the theoretical interface between neuroscience and psychology (Churchland). Pojman says that functionalism is the “heir to behaviourism”. Pojman also states that behaviourists either deny that mental events exist, or they deny their importance. However, functionalists state that there is a brain state and a mental state, which act in a causal relationship. They argue that the input-output relationship exists in a broader sense than an environmental input and behavioural output relationship (Pojman 1998). Functionalists hope to characterize psychological states in terms of their causal connections to behaviour, to stimuli, and to other mental states (Sober 1990). I shall argue that Functionalism is a dualist theory. Functionalism is a dualist theory because it advoca

In conclusion, functionalism is a dualist theory of the mind. It is dualist because it supports the idea of a brain state and a mental state. The functionalists claim that these two states interact through algorithmic computations. If functionalism were to be a monist theory of the mind, it would have to avoid the idea of a causal relationship between a brain and mental state. Since the functionalist does rely on the idea of a mental state and a brain state, they are doomed to be a dualist. Functionalism is dualism which tries to solve the interaction problem by claiming the interaction of these two states is done through an algorithmic system of computational processes. The functionalist tries to adhere to a doctrine of a physical brain state supported by mental events. The idea of a sole physical entity is a monist idea. Functionalists fall out of this category because they accept the existence and importance of mental events and suggest a causal relationship through computational interaction.

Functionalism poses the idea that thinking can be simulated through algorithms a

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