Even prior to the Gulf War, the U.S. had thrown its immense military, diplomatic, and economic weight behind the monarchies of the Persian Gulf like Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Though they rule over less than 10% of the world’s total population, these countries control most of its petroleum wealth (64% of the worlds oil reserves). Prior to the war, it was difficult for the U.S. to engage in military exercises or even arrange a port call without asking for permission months in advance.

However, because the Gulf nations have accepted acceptance of the balance it now brings, there is an effective, permanent U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. Still, in spite of, and sometimes because of this presence, the region’s instability continues.

Most Persian Gulf Arabs and their leaders felt threatened after Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait and were grateful for the strong U.S. leadership in the 1991 war against Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, for some, there is an enormous amount of cynicism regarding U.S. motives in waging that war. Many Arabs in the Gulf cannot shake the sense that the war was not fought for international law, self-determination,

The U.S. also is concerned with the Iraqi threat, though it may be overly estimated. Saddam’s attitude toward the U.S. is obvious, but still, it is unlikely he could pose a threat of a magnitude that the U.S. couldn’t handle. Kuwaitis, even though eight years of economic sanctions have degraded most of Saddam’s military, are still concerned about Iraq. Saudis, on the other hand, are much less concerned with Iraq’s threat. The Saudis are skeptics when it comes to the U.S. over estimating the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia. Some people in Saudi Arabia feel the “Iraqi threat” is an excuse for the U.S. to escalate its involvement in the region.

U.S. interests may not justify the costs and risks. Washington understandably wants to preserve access to reliable sources of oil and control an unpredictable political climate. However, neither reduced access to oil nor containing hostile regimes poses an intolerable threat to U.S. national security. Instead of acting as the guarantor of Persian Gulf security, the U.S. should make clear to southern Gulf monarchies they, not outside allies, are primarily responsible for their own defense. This will restore the idea of the GCC states to think seriously about security cooperation, not only with one another, but the entire Middle East and attempt to slow down terrorism by internal organizations against the U.S. in the Persian Gulf region.

The U.S. has also made a strong presence in Kurdish-populated Iraq. They made a series of air-strikes in September of 1996 , saying that Iraqi forces had illegally moved into the Kurdish areas of the country which had been under UN protection since Saddam’s brutal repression of the Kurds at the end of the Gulf War. There is reason to believe that the air strikes were to further frustrate the Iraqi dictator then to protect the Kurds. The Kurds are a nation of more than twenty million people divided among six countries. The worst repression of the Kurds in recent years has come from Turkey, a NATO ally which the U.S. considers part of Europe. Turkey received about $10.5 billion in military and economic support during the 1990’s. On several occasions, Turkish troops have crossed the Iraqi border to attack the Kurdish people. Though these attacks took place in the UN safe zone and have been far greater in scope than Saddam’s 1996 attacks, Pre

Some topics in this essay:
Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Iranian Iraqi, US-backed Turkish, Security Council, Arabs Gulf, Luckily Iran’s, Gulf War, Europe Turkey, Central Command, persian gulf, saudi arabia, southern gulf, gulf war, military presence, repression kurds, internal security, gulf region, kuwait oman, human rights, uae saudi arabia, persian gulf region, persian gulf security, kuwait oman qatar, presence persian gulf,