Analysis of The Military Strategies of The Campaign of Mantinea

The Peloponnesian War spanned many, many years in which two main factions, the Spartans and the Athenians, were warring for the domination of Greece along with the many surrounding villages; many with their own agendas. I will be doing an analysis of one particular campaign; the campaign of Mantinea fought in the year 362 B.C.E. To do this I first must bring to light some of the key players in this campaign, especially Epaminondas.

Epaminondas, a Theban general, was charged with the task to make the Peloponnese as weak as possible so they may overtake it with the least resistance. To do this the Thebans must play both sides of the war. The Thebans were supposedly allied with the Spartans but in those times that mattered little, treaties were broke and regained on a daily basis. Epaminondas had with him all the Boeotians, the Euboeans and many of the Thessalians; and while the Phocians were bound by treaty to assist the Thebans they found no reasoning in the treaty to justify them assisting with a foreign invasion. This was of little concern to Epaminondas seeing as once they were in the Peloponesse they had the help of the Argives, Messenians, the Tegeans,

Knowing he had the support of many factions, Epaminondas sped away into Peloponnese. He made it as far as Nemea and decided that this was the only way the Athenian army could come to invade Peloponnese. He assumed any loss to the Athenians would ultimately benefit Thebes and rally his allies and discourage those of the Athenians. Unbeknownst to him the forces opposing Thebes were gathering at Mantinea. Epaminondas' choice to use Nemea, as a striking point to wound the Athenians, was well justified but his intelligence was slow. The Athenians had decided instead of marching to Peloponnese they would sail into the gulf of Argolis in Spartan territory; then proceed to march through the same hostile territory to the assistance of the Arcadians. Upon hearing this he immediately marched for Tegea just south of Mantinea and directly in the path the Athenians would have to go to reach Arcadia. (Xenophon. 398)

Epaminondas ordered his men finish their meals and then prepare to march straight to Sparta. He would have succeeded in taking Sparta seeing as she was undefended had it not been for another stroke of bad luck. A Cretan had warned the Spartan King Agesilaus of Epaminondas' movements; so Agesilaus raced back to Sparta and got there before Epaminondas and his approaching army. The Spartans of the officer class took up their posts and were prepared to defend Sparta even though their numbers were few due to their entire cavalry, mercenaries, and three of their twelve battalions were away in Arcadia.

Epaminondas reached Tegea and let his infantry rest, but sent his cavalry on to Mantinea to attack the cattle and laborers, children and other varied people. Luck is a curious thing, and during this entire campaign it's obviously set on being against Epaminondas for the Athenian cavalry had just recently arrived either very close to or actually in the city of Mantinea. When the Mantineans saw the Epaminondas' cavalry on the horizon they quickly begged the Athenians to defend the people and livestock they had outside the city walls. The Athenian had just recently suffered a defeat at Corinth and were more than willing to regain their honor by defeating the enemy cavalry. The Athenian

Some topics in this essay:
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