Battle of Tarawa

The Battle of Tarawa and Amphibious Doctrine

In the two decades before the United States entered World War Two, the United States Marine Corps made a name for itself in the military establishment by being the only force to develop and prepare for amphibious warfare. The war in the pacific was to be the proving grounds for this amphibious doctrine and revalidate the Marines as the Americas premier fighting force. Tarawa was an example of the worst kind of close qua

r Admiral Kelly Turner, Commander Amphibious Force, to release 6th Marines if and when 2nd Marine Division needed it. (Isley & Crowl, 203). Besides the obvious the commanders made basic mistakes in mass, and security. Failing to realize that the troops being deployed lacked mass to properly deal with the Japanese in the initial wave, and security the Marines were picked off peace meal entering the assault. To make matters worse the commanders of the invasion then put themselves in an isolated area, the Makin Islands, eighty-five miles away from the more dangerous and difficult battle than on Tarawa. The U.S. commanders made three planning assumptions, violating the principles of strategy and operations, about Tarawa that also proved disastrous to the assault. (Alexander, Bloody Tarawa, 13). One mistake was that there would be adequate communication for the mission, that that there would be sufficient water over Betio's reef to permit Higgins boats to reach the shore and that prior bombardment by naval guns and carrier aircraft would destroy the fortifications on the island. (Bloody Tarawa, 13). All of the presumptions made by the commanders proved to be wrong. The Naval air and gun assets were unable to break down the Japanese defenses and only displaced them for a short time. It was clear that the landing force would have to provide the full force to seize the island with very little direct or indirect support. The arrival of the landing force in a solid, cohesive, functioning force was imperative. The initial assault plan was thrown out the window because of the transport shift and because stiff headwinds added to the delays at the assembly point including a ten mile round trip outside of enemy fire creating a delay in waves by twenty-eight minutes, which permitted Japanese to get heavy and accurate fire at the LVTs as they were channeled into the beach (Costello, 433). This created an overwhelming problem in itself not including the Higgins boats and the Marines they carried essential to victory had to wade in across the reef due to low tides, exposed to enemy fire. Tank loaded LCMs stranded on the coral ridge, which also needed adequate water clearance, were forced to disembark Sherman tanks into three feet of water, which drowned out some of the engines creating further obstacles to overcome (Morison, 303). With the heavy loses of LVTs, which had been planned to shuttle troops and supplies over the reef if necessary, and no landing craft able to float over the reef, "troops had to wade for 400 to 500 yards under heavy fire, in water waist-deep, which meant death by drowning from a wound, mine, or stumble into an underwater shell hole. (Morison, 303). These mistakes are indicative of the landings that occurred. The only part of the operation that went as planned was the taking of the dividing pier by second scout-sniper platoon allowing some relief from automatic-fire as Marines moved shoreward. Then the first element of Third Battalion, Second Marines advanced on red beach one with Red two on their left, a strong Japanese surface, causing approximately fifty percent casualties. Red beach three was taken by minimal force and Second Battalion, Eighth Marines only sustained twenty-five casualties, but was not able to gain forward momentum. Second Battalion, Second Marines were hit the worst, due to the inaccurate information on

Some topics in this essay:
Bloody Tarawa, Battalion Marines, Marine Division, Isley Crowl, Battle Tarawa, Sixth Marines, Marine Corps, Edwin Hoyt, Red Beach, Japanese Major, red beach, isley crowl, amphibious doctrine, battle tarawa, marine division, marine corps, amphibious warfare, battalion sixth marines, enemy fire, sherman tanks, world war, bloody tarawa 13, battalion eighth marines, amphibious assault force, united marine corps,