Iran And The USA In The 1970s
The Iranian revolution began in January 1978 and ended with the Shah's replacement by an Islamic fundamentalist government in February 1979. The subsequent seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, together with the failed rescue attempt and the Iran-Contra 'arms for hostages' scandal, represented a humiliating and painful period for American diplomacy, and is all the more remarkable for the extremely close relations previously enjoyed by the two countries. The traumatic collapse of the Pahlavi regime gravely damaged the power and credibility of the U.S. in a critical part of the world and led to a fundamental reappraisal of America's world-wide strategic commitments. This essay will analyse the long-standing relationship between Iran and the United States and argue that it was the peculiar nature and depth of this relationship, together with inter-agency conflict, which led to such a reversal of attitudes following the revolution.Iran, at the head of the Persian Gulf and stretching along its northern and eastern shores, has long served the western powers as a barrier against Russian ambitions toward the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Peninsula. In the nineteeenth
The Shah embraced this new relationship with alacrity: in the four years between 1972-76, the Iranian government ordered $9 billion worth of sophisticated weaponry from the United States, and with it came tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel. Joining the military advisors came thousands more civilian contractors, engaged on various industrial and social programmes designed to usher a deeply traditional society into the twentieth century at breakneck speed. The strong commercial and military ties remained unchanged under the Carter administration. Despite rumblings from Congress, and well documented human rights abuses, Thus, the American foreign policy of safeguarding the Iranian oil-fields and ensuring Iran remained in the Western camp, became inextricably entwined with the autocratic Shah; who was determined to modernise Iran and turn his country into the pre-eminent regional power. The Shah sought to lay the foundations of a modern, secular Iran when he instituted the 'White Revolution' in 1963. This resulted in a national uprising and the exile of one of the fanatical religious leaders, Ayatollah Khomeini; who believed the Americans to be '...foreign devils guiding the hand of the Shah'. Therefore, even before the 1970s, which greatly increased the U.S. presence in Iran, there was widespread hatred and distrust for the Americans who, in the minds of many Iranians, had simply replaced the British as the real power in Iran. perceptive judgement the administration would not accept. If blame is to be apportioned, the main fault lay with the White House and its appointees rather than State's career staff, plus the failure of the interagency process to discuss and evaluate all information. This was typified by the running feud between Secretary of State CyrusVance and the National Security Adviser Zbinew Brzezinski. Iran was quickly equipped with some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the American arsenal and became an important trading partner for both civilian and defence contractors in the USA. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger viewed Iran as a pillar of stability in a volatile region that was now recognised as vital to western security interests. Protecting that region from radical Arab states allied to Moscow was of tremendous importance to the West, and the pro-western Pahlavi regime was the lynchpin for this policy. the bureaucracy was directed into the familiar pattern of neglecting information that conflicted with U.S. policies." (Rubin:p.187-88) In addition, the radical reduction of Foreign Service Officers(FSOs) in Iran, plus the dimunition of contacts with the Iranian opposition, in response to the Shah's objections, meant the U.S. embassy was increasingly dependent for information from the SAVAK. Thus, the CIA reported to Carter in August 1978, that "...Iran is not in a revololutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." (Moens:p.217) Nevertheless, some FSOs in Iran, most notably the consul for Tabriz, Michael Metrinko, were acutely aware of the Shah's difficulties as far back as February 1978, but were discouraged from filing reports and criticised as being 'anti-Shah'. Likewise, Henry Precht, a middle-ranking official in charge of the State Department's Iran Desk, was warning anyone who would listen that the Shah could not survive politically, a " The crisis that came in 1978 developed rapidly, but not so suddenly as to have precluded a careful assessment of U.S. options and the formulation of a policy to enhance American interests." (Sullivan:p.176) However, to decide among these options required a full understanding of the nature of the revolution that was sweeping Iran; the magnitude of the dissatisfaction with the Shah, and its deep historical roots. Instead of an attempt at constructive dialogue with the opposition groups and a full analysis of all available information, institutionalised conflict, commercial interests, and lack of good intelligence, led
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Approximate Word count = 2854
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page double spaced)
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