I. The German High Command proposes a short “lightning” offensive in order to reduce the Soviet bulge in the lines.

II. The Soviets hear about Operation Zitadelle from “Lucy”.

III. The death ride of the German Army in Russia.

IV. The offensive’s failure results in the total loss of the Eastern Front as the German Army loses the intiative, manpower, and equipment.

The town of Kursk held a prewar population of 120,000 and was of little meaning in and of itself, except as a reference point. However, it was the land around Kursk that mattered to the Germans. The land consisted of a mixture of valleys, small copses, villages, small brooks, and the River Pena, which possessed steep banks and a fast moving current which made a very good defensive position. The roads were impassable in the winter and the wet muddy spring and the cornfields made visibility very poor. It was the high ground in the north that

As the Germans began to prepare for the offensive and started to marshal their forces, which took an extraordinary amount of time, the Soviets, who knew the attack was coming began to prepare their defense in-depth. They poured in over 200,000 civilian workers, who laid a fifty-mile wide railroad track from Stary Oskol to Livny in order to allow a faster buildup of their defensive network in the bulge area. The work continued around the clock and the Soviets even put up a very good anti-aircraft network of guns and fighters that kept snooping German reconnaissance aircraft away. Also, as in earlier attacks, the Soviets imposed a strict radio silence in the army and any Soviet troop who broke that silence was given the death sentence.

Hitler, however, following his form, never changed his mind once he had made it up, even in the face of his general’s advice. In fact, Model’s reports from the front were pessimistic at best and he sent along aerial photos that showed the massive Russian buildup in and around the Kursk salient. Here, Hitler made a fatal mistake that would ultimately cost him the war in the East. He threw the conference open to his generals who rapidly chose sides and squared off against one another. It was an old ploy of the Fuhrer’s that would have a nasty impact on him this time around.

The Russians now found that their defense setup of anti-tank guns worked very well against the new Tiger and Panther tanks. This setup, called a Pakfront, consisted of ten 76.2mm AT guns, grouped under one commander, who selected the target and called for a single volley of fire against one target at a time. Thus, several rounds hitting in a close proximity, weakened the armor until it was finally breached. Also, any rounds hitting the tracks caused an instant mobility kill which rendered the tank easy prey for the roaming sapper and combat engineer squads.

The Soviet 15th Rifle Division was taking the brunt of Model’s attack and by nightfall had yielded Bobrik and Butyrki, a scant six miles into the Soviet defense zones. Model still had five fresh divisions committed to the attack and he planned to use three in the next attack on the sixth and thus, hold two in reserve until needed. However, The Soviets were hard-pressed as well although not in a state that the Germans were in and General Rokossovsky was beginning to call up his reserves and some from the Steppe Front as well. This was now forcing General Model to commit all of the forces at his disposal and that would leave nothing in the area to hold back any Russian counterattacks that might crack the German lines.

The Soviets also had a great deal of intelligence help in the form of LUCY, a German veteran of World War One, whose real name was Rudolf Rossler, who was an ardent anti-Nazi. Lucy had access to the highest level of information emanating out of the German high Command which included detailed descriptions of: casualty lists, invasion plans and schedules, troop movements, logistical data, production figures, and shortfalls that the Germans were experiencing. Thus, “Lucy was passing along plans for Operation Citadel to STAVKA even as they were being formulated by Zeitzler, a full fortnight before Hitler issued Operations Order No. 6.”1

Another serious German blunder arose as the 2d SS Panzers were holding back waves of T-34s and holding the line waiting for Kempf’s 3d Panzer Corps. They were still on the other side of the Donets and twelve miles away from the fight. Had Kempf kept more to the plan and had his force in close proximity, he could have struck in time to swing the balance in favor of the Germans and send the Soviets fleeing the field. Kempf’s forces arrived on the 13th, in the morning, and were ready to take the fight to the Russians but Hitler had ordered Operation Citadel to stop as the allies were landing on Sicily and the Italians folding without a fight. Operation Citadel was a German disaster that would

Some topics in this essay:
Oskol Livny, Battle Kursk, Stalingrad Germans, German Command, Ninth Army, Germans Soviets, Marshal Zhukov, Operation Citadel, Panzer Division, Tiger Panther, operation citadel, “the soviet juggernaught”, soviet juggernaught” pg, “the soviet, soviet juggernaught”, juggernaught” pg, panzer corps, tank army, steppe front, 2d ss, battle kursk, german army, soviet sixth guards, 4th panzer division, “the battles” pg,