Pelloponesian Vs Napoleonic Wars

We will begin, as all wars do, with net assessments and social structures. Athens internal system is one of public forum and debate, this tends to make the majority happy, but slows decision making. Analogously, the Coalitions are made of many nations each with their own agenda, each hoping to achieve it through the defeat of Napoleon. Sparta was point ruled by a king, namely, Archedamus while Napoleon was similarly authoritative in his chain of command, believing that "one bad general is better than two good ones". These social intricacies carry great weight, as it is true that in any conflict, shared interests and loyalty to a

In addition to timing, Napoleon also used deception, mobility, and coordination with skill unparalleled by either side of the Peloponnesian wars, or arguably any other war to date. Even his British opponent Wellington believed that Napoleon's presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men. Being fully aware of the importance of intelligence, Napoleon silenced newspapers, closed borders, and detained travelers as a precursor to any conflict. Cavalry were then used not only as scouts of the enemy position, but upon approach were used as visual screens to conceal the formations of men behind them. The main body of Napoleon's army would remain divided into self-contained corps capable of moving great distances at unparalleled rates, converging only shortly before a battle into a formation called the bataillon carre. Napoleon added further efficiency to these formations with extraordinary motivational skills, dependent largely on the militaries self-romanticism, such as symbols and legends. The masterpiece of such Napoleonic strategy is surely the battle of Austerlitz. The battle started out with exemplary Napoleonic preparation by concealing a large force in the basin of the valley under the morning fog. By offering a small sample of his men on the hill to the east as bait, and faking a desire for peace Napoleon further deceived the allied forces to fall for his trap. Once again the Coalitions division of command was detrimental, as Kutuzov was highly suspicious of the situation, but was overruled by Weyrother, the Austrian chief of staff, and the remaining commanders. Because of the French superiority in mobilization, preparation, and coordination, they were able to vacate and retake the high ground, awaiting Kutuzov's charge with a wall of grape-shot, and luring the remainder of the allied forces into the frozen swampland to the west. Once again, Napoleon had used preparation, deception, unification of command, and mobility to destroy what was a superior allied power on paper. The allies entered Austerlitz with an overwhelming strength in manpower, good moral, and offensive plans. They left without 32 percent of their men, and without further hope of combating Napoleon as the third coalition.

In closing, and as sort of moral for the story, I will offer the belief that escalation beyond expectation was instrumental in the destruction of life in both the Peloponnesian and Napoleonic wars, if not a host of other conflicts throughout the history of human nature. When Pericles decided to starve Mergara into submission, it is doubtful that he foresaw thirty years of war and the eventual surrender of Athens as the result. Likewise Archidamus was under the impression that Athens could be quickly drawn into a land battle, destroyed and conquered. The Napoleonic wars, on the other hand, were more hegemonic and concerning the spread French influence, power and ideas. Central Europe through Napoleon's eyes was disheveled to the point t

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