A Critical Examination Of Valls’ Interpretation Of Just War Theory

In light of recent events and the current “war on terrorism” it seems critical to move away from political rhetoric and approach the issue with as much reasonable objectivity as possible. The central question that Andrew Valls attempts to answer is weather terrorism can be justified. He argues that it can in some cases when measured against just war theory. Just war theory sets moral limits on the waging of war while justifying its legitimacy. I am in agreement with his conclusion but my defense of his argument relies on acceptance of his definition of terrorism, which seems to me rather broad.

Valls defines terrorism as political violence done to persons or property committed by nonstate actors. It must be politically motivated for any other form of violence is considered crime and subject to domestic laws. He adds violence against property to include attacks that would be considered terrorism even though they do not harm people. An example of this would be the bombing of an abortion clinic. When he limits the violence to nonstate actors, he doesn’t deny the existence of state sponsored terrorism. He states that this type of violence is a matte

By the same token, terrorists must take it upon themselves to be more, rather than less discriminate in whom they target if their actions are to be considered justified under just war theory. As an excellent example of terrorists being discriminate, Valls cites the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut. They were anything but indiscriminate. Other cases can also be found. Thus, Walzer is inaccurate when he calls terrorism the random murder of innocent people. Even if a terrorist does involve the killing of innocents, Valls contends that this does not place terrorism beyond the scope of just war theory, which only requires that noncombatants not be targeted. This justifies the principle of double effect, which allows for civilian casualties as long as they are unintended effects of violence. Why can’t nonstate actors be held by the same standard? This principle only strengthens Valls’ argument. The morality of the principle of double effect comes into question, and rightly so if we use just war theory as a standard. So called collateral damage, which is a standard effect of modern warfare, seems to be nothing more than indiscriminate killing.

r of domestic justice, and in cases outside its borders, just war theory can be applied.

Under jus in bello, there are two categories, one being discrimination. This requires that those waging war distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets. This has usually been interpreted as meaning making the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. It can be argued that not all civilians in a population are truly innocent concerning the policies and actions of their governments, except maybe children. It is also difficult to describe what exactly innocence is. Valls helps to clarify this issue by using the work of Holm

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