British And French Attitude Toward Pre-war Germany

Both the British and the French had different attitudes toward pre-war Germany, but still kept the same interest in maintaining peace. The British took a more trusting approach on the Germans trying to see the good in German policy. The French, on the other hand, were much more cautious, knowing that any act of force against Germany would surely lead to war. The British moved for good relations with Germany, while France occupied their time looking for allies in case war broke out.

Many British officials were hesitant in thinking that Germany would be thought of as an enemy at the start of 1933. Sir Horace Rumbold, in early 1933 wrote that, “The present German Government has to rearm on land.” The British, generally, trusted Hitler, and understood the German position in revising the Paris Peace Treaty for which Germany was dealt unjustly. In 1934, Sir Eric Phipps wrote, “…Germany’s foreign policy may be said to comprise the following aims: Fusion with Austria; rectification of the eastern frontiers; some outlet for German energy to south or east; the recovery of some colonial foothold overseas…” The British knew that Germany could only pursue its forei

At the last moment possible, Britain and France were finally forced to give Germany an ultimatum in threat of war. It was September 2, 1939 and the allied countries, Britain and France were at disagreement of how much time to give Germany. Britain was ready to go to war, while France wanted to hold out hoping Germany would back out of its mindset mainly because it was France that would bear the burden of the German attack (224). Count Ciano of France speculated that “there was still hope of a German agreement if we could put off our démarche until midday tomorrow.” (225) In any case, the British knew it was impossible for them to hold out until the last minute.

The French attitude toward German foreign policy was that of defense. France knew that to oppose German aggression by force would no doubt lead to war. The most guaranteed way to defeat the Germans would only to have support from the other leading powers in Europe. “General Gamelin thinks that we can only enter the Rhineland zone…at the same time as the guarantor powers of Locarno (England, Italy)…British and Italian contingents must be with us and the Belgians.” (155) It was evident the fear France had of Germany on her own. It seemed France naively trusted her allies in order to keep Germany at the place France thought she should be in.

By December 1938, French opposition to war grew stronger. France now saw it senseless to oppose German expansion in the east, and used as an excuse to prevent a war, that the expansion was somewhat desirable (202). “I also think that it does not involve a major disadvantage for the future of the European balance of power…” (Wladimir d’Ormesson, 1938) Whether France would excuse Germany or not, it was certain that France could retreat no further; “we have reached the extreme limit beyond which the least hesitation, the least weakness would entail disasters…” (203)

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