At the end of this year it will have been 85 years since Austria-Hungary quietly slipped away into the history books. Over the decades since 1918 there has been a great deal of historic discussion over the reasons for the gradual disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire. Thus, the moment has perhaps approached to take one more look at what could be considered an outdated question, that of when did the collapse of the Habsburg Empire become inevitable? Could it have survived if it wasn’t such a victim of its own fragility and inner turmoil, or was it doomed by its decision in 1914 to abandon diplomatic solutions and opt for war, and what were the Allies roles, if any, in its demise?

Firstly, the degree of inevitability is questionable. How far back must one venture to find that precise point in time that inevitably led to the Habsburg Monarchy’s demise? Such a point can seldom be found. In fact Joachim Remak suggests that to trace ba

In reality it was the power imbalance that many historians have highlighted as one of the major contributing factors to the Monarchy’s fragility. Essentially Franz Joseph and his senior ministers had little political power against a generally unified Hungarian (Magyar) leadership. Williamson affirms that in 1907 the monarchy had got the Ausgleich reaffirmed by Hungary, suggesting relative constitutional stability. Yet, the monarchy had no effective Austrian ally as a counterweight in its negotiations with Budapest. This posed a huge problem for the Habsburgs considering their need for control and the ability to pursue their own domestic and foreign interests. Furthermore the regular renegotiations of the Ausgleich allowed an increase in Hungarian power. Murad author of Franz Joseph of Austria and his Empire, wrote: ‘Hungary in effect ruled and exploited the entire Monarchy…With every ten year renewal of the “Settlement”, Hungarian demands became bolder…If it had not been for the First World War, it is likely that Hungary would have become independent by the time of the next renewal of the “Settlement” in 1917.’ This is an interesting statement considering that to some extent it was the balance of power under the Ausgleich agreement that contributed an internal state of affairs that saw the Habsburgs resorting to militarism in 1914.

It was increasingly certain that the subversive activity pursued on Bosnian-Herzegovinian soil to a frightful degree, and with ramifications in Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and Hungary could be checked only by energetic action at Belgrade, where the threads run together; and that a new grouping of the Powers is coming into being in the Balkans with the connivance of Roumania and Russia, with the destruction of the Monarchy as its ultimate aim. I am well aware of my grave responsibility, given our exposed position, the unreliability and jealousy of our Italian ally, the hostility of Romanian public opinion, and the weight Slavophile advice carries at the court of the tsar. But the responsibility for doing nothing and letting things drift on until the waves meet over our heads would seem to me even more serious – even if for the moment an easier one – than that of facing up to the danger and taking the consequences.

Basically the Monarchy’s future would be threatened by Serbian nationalism and Franz Joseph was afraid of that. Furthermore Vienna was certain that the relative strength of the Slavs, apparently backed by Russia and France, posed an immediate threat to the Monarchy, and that in the immediate future, this threat would continue to grow. Thus it seemed direct action was in fact needed. This statement is supported by an exert from a private letter from Berchtold, the Habsburg Foreign Minister 1912-15, to Mérey, the ambassador to Rome 1910-15, dated 21 July 1914, were he states:

Essentially the declaration of war in 1914 and the policies of the Ballhausplatz that led up to it killed the monarchy. For 47 years the Ballhausplatz (the Foreign Ministry) had pursued peaceful diplomatic alternatives. The possibility of armed action against Serbia, Roumania or Russia, had been discussed often enough since 1866. Furthermore the Monarchy’s intricate web of alliances had been designed to meet the contingency of war. Yet it had been avoided. What then led the Ballhausplatz to opt for a military solution to resolve the problem of the South Slavs?

Some topics in this essay:
Habsburg Empire, Habsburg Monarchy, Ottoman Empire, World War, Eric Hobsbawm, Roumania Russia, Hungarian Magyar, Germans Habsburgs, Constituent Assembly, Habsburg Empire’, habsburg monarchy, world war, habsburg empire, franz joseph, raison d’état, habsburgs raison d’état, power sharing, collapse habsburg, declaration war, resumption normal, peace government, resumption normal relations, rise nationalistic sentiment,