15th February 1942 marked the fall of Singapore to the hands of the Japanese. All along, Singapore had been the base of British power in South East Asia and had been viewed as a British fortress. Thus the collapse of a fortress in merely 70 days was a humiliating defeat for the British. However, judging from the circumstances prior to the war, the fall was inevitable. British attitude towards Singapore defence ever since the 1820s directly caused the rapid defeat. Various defence schemes for Singapore had been proposed, from Captain Edward Lake’s plan in 1827 to Collyer’s scheme in 1850 , but none had been fully implemented. In short, a lot had been said about defending Singapore, but very little had been done. Thus resulting in the lack of proper defence in Singapore. In addition, Britain over reliance on America to protect her interest in times of conflict is naivety on her part as America had a policy of non-intervention and disarmament then. The indecisiveness and hesitation of the British, especially on the issue of using Thailand as a defence base, let the Japanese had a chance

Consolidating all the major factors and circumstances in 1942, the fall of the British fortress was inevitable. Had the British taken an active interest in Singapore’s defence right from the 1820s they would not have been faced with the situation of lack of defences against Japanese attacks and Singapore would truly lived up to her name as an impregnable British fortress. Had

to beat them to it first. In comparison the Japanese army were well trained, experienced, efficient and had well-planned strategies. I shall thus show that the defeat is inevitable by further assessing Singapore’s defence and the attack put up by the Japanese in later paragraphs. To property evaluate the defence Singapore had prior to the war we must start from the 1820s.

The complacency and convenient assumptions made by the British also brought about their inevitable defeat. One reason for British negligence in deterring landward attacks was the assumption that the natural terrain and tropical vegetation of the Malay Peninsular would deter any invading force. This was definitely not the situation prior to the war. Malaya was no longer the thick area of impassable jungle and mosquito-infested swamps as it was previously. Many new roads had been built and it was likely that the Japanese would use these roads in their advance. Before 1935, popular British opinion was that the Japanese would launch a naval attack, to this they have the Singapore Strategy as an answer. This strategy was in turn built on other assumptions, like the royal navy being able to arrive promptly in Singapore in the event of war. However this assumption will fail in the event that Britain was also engaged in war, since they would not be able to send enough reinforcements to Singapore in time. To this Britain relied on America to protect her interest, but this is just wishful thinking on her part. America, since early 1941 had already voiced that she would not get involved in the conflicts and Britain had to fend for herself, meaning that Singapore would not get America’s protection. Britain’s over-reliance on other powers was also witnessed years ago during the 1915 Sepoy Mutiny. Japanese army was called in to help put down the mutiny, and this help to boost Japanese’s pride while reflecting badly on the British. This reliance on foreign powers to safeguard her interest was also a signal of Britain’s weakening power. This, combine with Britain prime minister Winston Churchill blind faith in Singapore’s siege defence lay the foundations for the inevitable defeat Britain was to suffer.

The attitude and the quality of the troops were also deciding factors in the outcome of the war. To the British, Singapore was of secondary importance since Europe was also at war at that time and their first priority was to protect Britain. The Japanese on the other hand were determined to exploit the natural resources of Malaya to aid their quest in China and they considered themselves to be fighting for a glory cause. The GOC Malaya Command for the Brit

Some topics in this essay:
Madras Engineers, Edward Lake’s, Command November, Singapore British, Lt-Gen Yamashita, Japanese British, Arthur Percival, East Asia, Winston Churchill, Malay Peninsular, singapore’s defence, british fortress, defence singapore, singapore defence, fall british, prior war, japanese army, defence schemes, sepoy mutiny, inevitable defeat, thailand neutral country, goc malaya command, fall british fortress, british fortress inevitable, viewed british fortress,