A frequently, and sometimes hotly, discussed subject; the outcome of the American Civil War has fascinated historians for generations. Some argue that the North’s economic advantages proved too much for the South, others that Southern strategy was faulty, offensive when it should have been defensive, and vice-versa. Internal division in the South is often referred to, and complaints made against Davis’ somewhat makeshift, inexperienced, government. Doubts are sometimes raised over the commitment of Southerners to a cause many of them were half-hearted about. Many historians have argued that the South lost the will to fight long before defeat was an inevitability. However, many of these criticisms could easily be applied to the North, had the outcome been different, and a simple superiority in resources is an insufficient explanation, when one considers the many examples in history, not least the American War of Independence, when a weaker defender has kept a far stronger attacker at bay. James Mc Pherson offers an alternative view in his contingency theory, where he outlines four turning points in the war which led ultimately to Southern defeat. However, while a recital of the war’

Most historians agree that Lincoln was a greater leader than Davis, although at the start of the war it appeared that the opposite was true. The more experienced Davis soon built up a sound army, commanded by excellent generals. However, while a good military man, Davis was no politician. His ego bruised easily, and some of his decisions appeared to have been motivated more by personal like or dislike of an individual than any strategic reason. His decision to retain Bragg and leave Beauregard and Johnston in the cold is one such example of this. Whitridge argues that Davis ‘would never have practised the arts of the politician, even if he had understood them’, having, ‘learned to obey and command; but nothing in his experience had taught him how to persuade and conciliate’. Lincoln, on the other hand, was a masterful diplomat, prepared to overlook personal differences, for example with McClellan, for the good of the Union. He never once faltered in his determination to save the Union, and entertained no doubts as to the wisdom of his policy. It must be remembered though, that Davis was by no means a weak leader, and had a great deal to contend with in terms of belligerent State governors, supply shortages, and teething troubles which would affect any new government. Also, given the tragic circumstances surrounding Lincoln’s death, and the worthiness of his cause, there has been a tendency to romanticise him and his achievements, which any historian must guard against.

However, the ingenuity of many Southern officers compensated somewhat for her material disadvantages. Not once did a Southern army surrender for want of ammunition, and despite being in terrible disrepair, the Confederacy’s railroads somehow fulfilled their task of transporting troops to battle on several notable occasions. Historian Edward Pollard commented that ‘something more than numbers make armies’, and Southern leader P G T Beauregard remarked that the outcome could not be explained by ‘mere material contraints’. Furthermore, the South had several clear advantages at the start of the war. Firstly, fighting on home ground was easier since supply lines were shorter, natives friendlier, and knowledge of the climate and terrain better. The vast area of the Confederacy made occupation by an invader virtually impossible, and the coastline with its many inlets and bays made for difficult blockading. Secondly, most of the US Army’s best leaders were Southerners, so, at the start at least, the Confederacy had superior leadership in battle. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, military historians reckon that attacking in this period required thrice the manpower that defending did, virtually wiping out the North’s demographic advantages. It would seem, therefore, that although the North’s superior resources undoubtedly helped, this alone does not fully account for the Southern defeat.

The North’s superiority in manpower and resources must not be omitted in any answer to this question. Lincoln had at his disposal a

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