On “December 6, 1941, a message that was intercepted by the US navy is placed before Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Sent from Tokyo to a Japanese Embassy in Washington, it was encoded in the top-level Japanese "Purple Code", it stated that the Japanese were going to end relations with the United States. Roosevelt, after reading the thirteen-page transmission said, This Means War." Although Roosevelt supposedly had knowledge of the Japan’s intentions, he did nothing to counteract or to inform others about the threat.

“Some of our readers may be shocked by

Stinnett’s book gives proof that American Naval intelligence had broken the Japanese code about 15 months before the attack. He also proves that FDR knew about the attack about a year in advance and he even knew that the attack would be on Sunday morning a little over a week before hand. People had begun suspecting that Pearl Harbor was all a set-up. They believed that FDR both provoked and welcomed the war; and some even suspected that he knew of the attack beforehand. Establishment historians and government officials argue against these charges by insisting that the attack was indeed a surprise due to a failure of American intelligence and ineffectiveness of the naval high command. Stinnett quotes historian Stephen E. Ambrose who claimed that the real problem was that American intelligence was terrible. According to Ambrose, the navy had not yet broken the Japanese naval codes, and the Japanese task force maintained strict radio silence on its way to Hawaii. As a result, in late November, intelligence lost the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet. Other historians have challenged that “the Japanese caught us by surprise due to faulty analysis of pretty good intelligence, bureaucratic squabbling among high-level naval officers in Washington, underestimation of Japanese courage and capabilities, and expectations that the attack would come against Dutch or British possessions in East Asia, not against Hawaii.” Stinnett exposes each one of these theories to be false. He reveals, in detail, that the ships of the Japanese carrier fleet engaged in daily radio communication with their high command in Japan, military commands in the Central Pacific, and with each other. Stinnett uncovered the truth by reading American naval intelligence radio intercepts of the Japanese transmissions. He came to the conclusion that American intelligence did not lose the Japanese carriers, but covered up the fact that they were on their way.

Perhaps the single most important document discovered by Stinnett is a memorandum written by Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence on October 7, 1940. “McCollum’s memo outlines a strategic policy designed to goad the Japanese into committing an overt act of war against the United States. McCollum writes that such a strategy is necessary because it is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado. McCollum suggests eight specific actions that the United States should take to bring about this result. The key one is Action F that calls for keeping the main strength of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the vicinity of the

Some topics in this essay:
Pearl Harbor, Japan Roosevelt’s, According Ambrose, Tokuyama” Roosevelt’s, United Navy, War Roosevelt, Pearl Harbor’s, United McCollum, Kimmel Short, Pacific Stinnett, pearl harbor, american naval, naval intelligence, american intelligence, kimmel short, american naval intelligence, surprise attack, overt act war, carrier fleet, surprise due, roberts commission, japanese naval, marshall stark testified, world war ii, helping japanese build,