The Significance Of D-Day
“I experienced an interesting psychological change in the few minutes before and immediately after take off. As I had climbed aboard and strapped myself into my seat I felt tense, strange and extremely nervous. It was as if I was in a fantasy dream world and thought that at any moment I would wake up from this unreality and find that I was back at the barrack room at Bulford camp, where we laughed and sang to raise our spirits- and perhaps to show others that we were not scared- personally I knew I was frightened to death. The very idea of carrying out a night time airborne landing of such a small force into the midst of the German army seemed to me to be little more than a suicide mission. Yet at the moment that the glider parted company with the ground I experienced an inexplicable change. The feeling of terror vanished and was replaced with exhilaration. I felt literally on top of the world. I remember thinking, ‘you’ve had it chum, it’s not good worrying anymore – the die has been cast and it was to be, will be, and there is nothing you can do about it.’ I sat back and enjoyed my first trip to Europe.” Yet another rifleman who was carried to the beach in the LCVP’s relates
He made another bad mistake in June 1941 by declaring war on Russia, until then his ally. His Italian and Japanese partners also made mistakes. They both attempted more than they had the strength to handle. Italy pushed the war into North Africa. Japan brought the United States into the conflict, on December 7th of that same year, by attacking Hawaii (Pearl Harbor) the Philippines and other American possessions in the Pacific. American military strategists, like the British, began to plan for the day when the Allies would invade Europe to destroy the powerful German army. Among the others was the weather. Before the U-Boat threat was removed in May 1943, the Germans maintained several weather stations throughout the Atlantic. After May 1943, the Germans were largely ignorant of Atlantic weather patterns. In contrast, the Allies were aware of much of the weather on the Continent, mainly through the Ultra encrypts. This disparity was a distinct disadvantage for the Germans. Because of Overlord’s strict landing requirements, there were only three days in which the invasion could have occurred: June 5, 6, and 7. It was imperative that the weather was good on at least one of these days. Otherwise, the invasion would have to have been delayed until the end of June or the beginning of July. By this time, it probably would have been to late, as the Germans would have been better fortified. Thus the invasion had to take place in June, at the very latest, if it were to be assured a reasonable chance of success. General Spaatz, commanding the United States Strategic Air Force (USSTAF), believed simply that ‘Overload’ was unnecessary. Air Chief Marshal Harris, his British opposite number, agreed with him. General Arnold, the representative of the US air arm on the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached similar conclusion. None of these commanders ‘objected’ to ‘Overload’ or its demands upon their forces. They believed simply if they continued with their bombing strategy the demands would be met. Nazi Germany was being dissected, and destroyed behind its armies. The vast concentrations of heavy industry in the Ruhr and Saar valleys, coal, oil, synthetic fuels, ball bearings, roads, railways, and cities were all being steadily reduced to rubble. The bomber chiefs were agreed on their missions, but not on their choices of targets. Oil, General Spaatz believed, was the essential upon which a modern nation at war must depend. These beliefs made the commanders of the strategic bomber forces careless of the tactical demands or armies. Strategically, they declared that the bombing was winning the war, and not the air power. The leading ground troops merely noted the results. They were glad to see that all the planes in the sky belonged to the Allies, not to the Germans. The men in the landing boats were delighted that the first steps of the assault had gone so smoothly. It had been noted on a higher level that unless the fighter strength of the enemy could be broken ‘it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction plan.’ A new plan was drafted. Operation “Pointblank” raising the reduction of the German fighter strength to the first priority, while retaining the ultimate objective of the bomber offense. These conclusions, with their notes of pessimism, were not shared by the bomber commanders, and were echoes of a new problem of an immense significance. Air power, and particularly the bomber, had introduced a new dimension into warfare. Despite results, which were at best, inconclusive, and the continued growth of enemy fighter strength, the Commanders of the Allied Strategic Air Forces had reached the conclusion that they controlled the decisive instrument; that they could achieve victory alone. D-Day was, probably, the most decisive battle of the Second World War. It was the largest amphibious invasion of all time; over 155,000 Allied troops were disembarked on the
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Approximate Word count = 3272
Approximate Pages = 13 (250 words per page double spaced)
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