In Richard A. Smith's (1995) "Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress," he presents the theory that interest groups do, in fact, influence Congressional decisions, but far less than commonly thought. Smith examines research by a number of authors of opposing sides, enabling him to support this theory. The two questions this article focuses on are: "How and to what extent do campaign contributions by interest groups influence the legislative decisions and actions of individual members of Congress?"(Smith 90-91) And second, "how and to what extent do the lobbying activities of interest groups influence the legislative decisions and actions of individual members of Congress"(Smith 90-91)? He addresses the argument that campaign contributions "buy access, not votes"(Smith 93). .
The article also states that lobbying influences Congress by "reinforcing and mobilizing" members who already support their positions (Smith 97). The argument that campaign contributions greatly influence legislative decisions of members of Congress leading to overrepresentation of certain interests is also reviewed in this article. One weakness Smith exposes in the work he reviews is that "the evidence offered by journalists and others supporting this idea fails to establish convincing counterfactuals of what individual members of Congress would have done had they not received campaign .
contributions from an interest group (91). Another weakness presented is that it is difficult to measure the access gained by lobbyists. .
In Henry Teune's "Legislative Attitudes Toward Interest Groups," he proposes the theory that attitudes of legislative candidates toward interest groups tend to be positive. Candidates have many reasons to have this perspective toward interest groups. The main reason would be that legislative candidates need political and financial security, and what better way to obtain this than through campaign contributions.