In August of 1982 the government amended the charges and maintained the original charges but now pursuant to CERCLA which had been enacted in December of 1980. .
The pinnacle of the NEPACCO defense was the legality of the charges pursuant to CERCLA of 1980. Since the dumping was prior to CERCLA being passed, the court had to decide whether the CERCLA could be applied to pre-1980 acts. The United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit had found that in fact CERCLA could be applied to pre-1980 incidents. The defendant's had maintained that due-process was violated if CERCLA could be applied retro-actively. CERCLA reads, "Unless otherwise provided all provisions of this chapter shall be effective on December 11, 1980" (CERCLA, Chp. 302). The court had found that Congress had intended to allow for CERCLA to be applied retroactively, showing that CERCLA Chapter 302 is "merely a standard effective date provision that indicates the date when action can first be brought- (CERCLA, Chp. 302). .
The other main point of the defense was that the defendants were not liable for the cost associated with the clean up of the toxic waste. The court found that liability did .
Stankunas 3.
apply to the defendants under CERCLA Chapter 107 which states that anyone who arranged for transport or who owned and operated the facility at the time of the disposal. .
The court found that CERCLA, since it could be applied retroactively, the defendants did operate and oversee the transport of hazardous waste and were therefore liable (Plater, 268). The court found that all three of the defendants were liable and had to pay for the clean of the Denney Farm and also have to pay any future costs associated with the Denney Farm. .
The opinion of the court established the first precedents of CERCLA. First showing that the cleaning expenditures pre-CERCLA were in fact covered legally and also the act of dumping itself was covered under CERCLA even though it had taken place before CERCLA was enacted.
