In their paper eTransworld Sanctity and Plantingas Free Will Defense, they intend to develop a concept such that it would be impossible if transworld depravity is possible. They dub this eTransworld Sanctity (TWS). Next, this concept will be run through their eepistemic amendment to see if it is still reasonable to believe in Plantingas TWD. They define their epistemic, which they take as an assumption, as thus: One shows that G(od) is compatible with E(vil) by deploying a Plantinga-style defense only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing those claims that constitute it (2). We will grant them this amendment, although it seems to me that they need to define what it is to ereasonably refrain from believing something. .
For this paper, I am not interested in whether it is more reasonable to believe in TWD or TWS. My purpose here is modest. I am concerned with a misquantification that occurs in Howard-Snyder & OLeary-Hawthornes piece, namely in their definition of TWS. First I intend to show what Plantinga logically claims with TWD, then I will show what his opponents logically claim with TWS. Next, I will show why the latters definition is mistaken. Finally, I will attempt to provide a solution to the problem by showing what Howard-Snyder & OLeary-Hawthorne should have said. .
2. The Claims.
Plantinga wants to devise a defense against the problem of evil. Now, a defense is different than a theodicy in the sense that a defense just wants to show that God and evil are compatible in the broadly logical sense, in other words, possibly compatible, whereas a theodicy wants to show why God and evil are compatible in the actual world. So all Plantinga has to do is show a possible situation in which an omnipotent and wholly good God couldnt create moral good without moral evil. The possible world that he believes fulfills this requirement is the world where all essences suffer from transworld depravity.
