After the explosion the graphite burned for nine days and was the main contributor to radiation being released into the atmosphere (World Nuclear Association 2). The water used in cooling the reactor at Chernobyl was pressurized boiling water, as opposed to cool water, which absorbs more heat; thus, the water used increased the amount of pressure in the reactor. This added to the instability as well. The concrete containment block was not enough to contain an explosion or any radiation thereafter. There was only one block; thus no redundancy was engineered for containment. In fact, the explosion blew the "1,000-ton concrete slab- onto the other side of the plant in a split second (Pincus 1). .
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Safety is crucial in nuclear power plants and is probably the most revised and observed issue in plants today. However, this was not the case in dealing with Chernobyl. Safety can be in the design of the reactor and also in the way the design is operated. Unfortunately, both of these types of safety issues were disregarded at Chernobyl. The reactor itself over heated instead of shutting down when something went wrong. It also lacked a dome to contain radiation if trouble occurred. Certain redundant safety procedures were not followed at all the night of the terrible tragedy. The operators were conducting a test the night of the disaster that had actually failed a year before. The plant's turbo-generator was shut off and the emergency protection systems were blocked. A few seconds later, the reactor had a "catastrophic increase in reactor power- which resulted in too much steam. Since the protection systems were blocked nothing could be done. This lead to the first explosion, which occurred at 1:24 am (Pincus 1). .
If the same test proved not to work a year before, then the operators at Chernobyl should never have tried again without adequate repairs and/or alterations to improve the plant. The actual test was to determine how long the turbines would spin and supply power without a supply of energy (I.
