In this case President Johnson feared reaction by the public, reasoning that "if it appeared that the "smart" people were opposing intervention, then others might conclude that dissent was not unpatriotic." .
Small describes the next years of the war as a "coming apart," declaring that 1967 was "the worst year of Johnson's presidency," in part because of the large number of riots that year and a shifting in conventional American values. The author argues that the media exacerbated the volatile conditions of 1967 and that Johnson's predicaments were the result of this chaotic public dialogue. Some of the president's actions, including a negotiating letter sent directly to Ho Chi Minh, were a direct result of anti-war activities that included protests by academics and elites and a flood of anti-war media reports. The following year a major setback in the battle for public opinion was thrust upon the Johnson administration. The January 31, 1968 assault known as the Tet Offensive was a decisive blow to President Johnson's public relations battle. Small argues that "although Hanoi ultimately failed in its main military objectives, it won the battle for American public opinion." And as public opposition to the war peaked, Johnson was forced to realize that the war was, in the author's words, "crippling the United States." .
When Richard Nixon took over the White House, a majority of Americans thought the war was a mistake. In demonstration after demonstration, the doves continued to push for an end to the war. In 1969 Nixon announced the withdrawal of some troops, yet the president continued to fight for public support, claiming in November of that year that the "silent majority" of Americans were not like the radical doves. By 1970 a massive public relations disaster landed on the Nixon administration when, ten days after announcing the withdrawal of 150,000 troops, the president ordered the invasion of Cambodia.
