Thus, paradoxically, by demonstrating their expertise in a more.
practical area of competence, the leaders of the CCP felt they could demonstrate how they were serving the people. To.
be sure, the move toward economic reform came about as a result of a "changed domestic and international environment,.
which altered the leadership's perception of the factors that affect China's national security and social stability" (Xu 247).
But Shirk feels that, in those pre-Tienenmen days, such a move came about also as a result of an attempt by CCP leaders.
to demonstrate, in a more practical and thus less obviously ideological manner than Mao had done, their moral force.
This is not to say that the idea of economic reform was embraced enthusiastically by all members of the leadership of the.
Chinese Communist Party in 1978. To a great extent, the issue of economic reform became politicized as the issue was.
used as a means by Deng Xiaoping to attain the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's successor, Hua.
Guofeng, had "tried to prove himself a worthy successor to Mao by draping himself in the mantle of Maoist tradition. His.
approach to economic development was orthodox Maoism with an up-to-date, international twist" (Shirk 35). This.
approach was tied heavily to the development of China's oil reserves. "[W]hen [in 1978] estimates of the oil reserves.
were revised downward[,] commitments to import plants and expand heavy industry could not be sustained" (Shirk 35).
Deng took advantage of this economic crisis to discredit Hua and aim for leadership of the party. "Reform policies.
became Deng's platform against Hua for post-Mao leadership" (Shirk 36).
