62). In other words, knowledge cannot be "brought" into the mind, like the people who lived in caves could not live in the new world because their eyes could not learn to handle the new brightness.
Plato's view in comparison with Armstrong is a tiny bit similar. In Armstrong's writings he talks about a certain type of knowledge that he calls "non-inferential knowledge," which is knowledge we obtain without any reasons for it. He suggests that there must be a "law-like connection" allowing us to have belief in these situations. One famous example of non-inferential knowledge, which I will talk more about in a little bit, is how we will read a thermometer without coming up with any reasons for believing it (as long as it is in a normal world with nothing out of the ordinary). Armstrong's non-inferential knowledge is like Plato's conceptual knowledge by there being no reasoning or learning behind it. It is already in the mind- it has not been taught.
Although Armstrong and Plato have some similarity, their basic theory of knowledge contrast each other greatly. Armstrong's theory on knowledge is that we need to have justification to prove every piece of knowledge that we have, kind of like evidence. But what ends up happening is that for every justification we make, we need another justification for that and then another one for that and it just keeps continuing on endlessly. Armstrong shows this by saying, .
"But even if "p" is true, A believes that p, A has evidence "q" for the truth of "p," "q" is in fact sufficient evidence for "p," and the evidence actually operates in A's mind to support his belief that p, it still does not follow that A knows that p. For although "q" in fact supports "p" conclusively, might not A be reasoning from "q" to "p" according to some false principle which in this particular case moves from a truth to a truth?" (Armstrong, p.216).
This problem is known as the "infinite regress.
