S. armed forces" (Flaherty 94). President Kennedy did not want the American people worrying about events and Cuba, and more importantly, he did not want Cuba to expect an invasion. John F. Kennedy debated and thought about what could be done in Cuba. Senator Fullbright from Arkansas urged Kennedy to hold back from Cuba. Fullbright wanted the U.S. to focus on the Russian government and resolve problems overseas (Pearson 13). Finally, in mid-April, Kennedy gave the Central Intelligence Agency permission to invade Cuba. Kennedy gave the CIA full control of the attack, including when, where, and all the strategy plans for the invasion. After the decision for the attack was made, meetings continued in the State Department building where Kennedy and 19 of his advisers made speeches and voiced their opinions and ideas on Cuba (Schlesinger 252). The exact location of the attack was a very important decision that had to be decided. The choices were narrowed down to three beaches, Trinidad, Zapata, and Cochinos Bay. Trinidad and Zapata were ruled out, because too many civilians lived there and the beachhead wasn't large enough (253). Finally, after many hours of debating, the CIA decided to attack Bahia de Cochinos, the Cuban name for the Bay of Pigs (Guido). Colonel Jack Hawkins, military planner for the U.S. in 1961, told Kennedy and the CIA, "Further efforts to develop armed internal resistance, or to organize Cuban exile forces, should not be made except with a planned overt intervention by United States forces" (Robinson). Col. Hawkins wanted to use Cuban soldiers who had defected from Castro when he took over Cuba. Hawkins also wanted every detail considered before an attack was executed. 1,500 Cuban exiles and 300 U.S. soldiers and frogmen were trained at Puerto Cabezas, which was code named "Happy Valley" ("The Price"). On April 10, Cuban men began boarding military boats, and final plans were designed on April 14.
