In its most bullish form, proponents of this view contend: .
New technology will lead to big productivity increases that will cause high economic growth--actually, waves of technology will continue to role out through the early part of the 21st century . and a new ethos of openness . will transform our world into the beginnings of a global civilisation, a new civilisation of civilisations, that will blossom through the coming century.7.
This view, influential amongst representatives of the networked economy' of international managerial policy elites (Davos Man), is vertically linked into the global economy in a flexible fashion. It finds voice amongst auteurs of the borderless world. It is a technologically-driven, economistic definition. But, it is bereft of any sense of the limits of liberalisation or any serious political theory that might lead to a realisation of the problematic nature of the teleology espoused. Prior to the economic downturns of 1997 it demonstrated little appreciation of any of the downsides of globalisation or indeed, the countervailing pressures that globalisation might call forth. .
It is also essentially a triumphalist view of globalisation. The first triumph of the West, over state-controlled collectivism in the Soviet empire, has been followed by a second triumph over heterodox capitalist development strategies. Following the first wave of the Asian economic crisis of late 1997, the Anglo-American economic model was deemed to have triumphed over Asian developmental statism; the so-called meltdown' appeared containable within the region. Europe too was languishing economically. Triumphalism (and Schadenfreude) in magazines such as The Economist was rampant. Indeed, for many in the West' the hubris of the Asian way' was getting its cum-uppance. Wall Street, Washington and the international financial institutions initially saw the Asian crisis as a window of opportunity'.
