The beginning of the twenty-first century saw such an alarming rise in events where chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were involved. In May 1998, India and Pakistan both

Another sub-theory in realism, talks about weapon deterrence and whether it actually works. Some realist believe that if two countries have the same weapons does that maintain a form of deterrence? Or would the two countries just have a conventional war since the fear of anything escalating beyond that would be reduced? Or would the two countries not even have a conventional war, because of the fear of escalation? Many realist believe that there is no real easy solution to these questions that is why Glenn Snyder came up with the phrase “the stability/ instability paradox” All realist theorist would have to agree, though, that an ambassador form another country when thinking about the stability/instability paradox would have to look his own military and then that of his adversaries to see the balance of power.

Now that we have finished talking about the military aspect for having and controlling weapons of mass destruction, I will focus this paper on the command and control procedures. When discussing command and control with the organization theory, we must remember that these are true soldiers who think war is just around the corner. In this theory organizational leaders value “autonomy or turf as much as, if not more than, having extra resources at their disposal” Autonomy is especially important to ensure that organizational members-and not outsiders- are determining how military missions are executed. When it comes down to unconventional weapons officers should press hard to seek both the independent means and the power to use any all weapons that a state has in their arsenal. Officers should have complete control over the weapons and not have answer to anyone. However, realist belief that the command and control system should be well integrated with it military doctrine. The theory for command and control is quite simple, they believe that it is up to the states military doctrine to determine if the have a delegative or assertive command and control. Therefore, there is not one set system to follow, since states find themselves in different security climates. Under realistic logic “states are likely to develop a highly assertive national command and control system under three conditions: if a proliferate state faces only conventionally armed adversaries, its leaders can easily afford to maintain extreme tight control over its arsenal, and finally if the capital city is located to far away to be hit be a retaliatory strike from enemy forces” And the last theory which is called the strategic culture theory states that the command and control systems should be strongly influenced by domestic political interests and decision making decision-making traditions. The cultural arguments have been used to explain important details of the Soviet Union’s nuclear command and control system during the Cold War. According to Bruce Blair, “the procedures for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons embodied a core value of Russian political cultural, collective centralized decision-making”

First, before I talk about these three theories the idea of military doctrine should be better explained. Basically, military doctrine consists of plans that a country makes deciding how and when military force should be used. With this definition in mind, there are a wide variety of guidelines that a country can adapt: “whether they are basically offensive or defensive in nature; whether they call for a decisive use of force or whether they permit more limited operations; and how do they define the targets-military forces, enemy leaders, or industrial capabilities-that need to be destroyed in a war” .

Right now it is very difficult for non nuclear states to acquire the materials that would be necessary to make a long range nuclear weapon with a yield beyond a few megatons. All the material that it takes to make a bomb is closely monitored b

Some topics in this essay:
North Korea, England Biological, India Pakistan, Glenn Snyder, , Military Doctrine, United America, Gas Lewisite, Bruce Blair, Aum Shinrikyo, command control, military doctrine, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, vx gas, sarin gas, military officers, mass destruction, biological weapons, command control system, offensive doctrines, command control systems, weapons mass destruction, botulin toxin ebola, command control procedures,