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Flaws of the Southern Campaign

 

            The war in the northern states had essentially become a stalemate from the summer of 1778 onward. After securing New York, Clinton took his army and Royal Navy south where, the British believed, it could roam about freely due to the large number of loyalists supposedly still in the area. The British assumed that the loyalists would provide support for a continued effort and a re-engagement of the Colonialists.
             The southern campaign initially went well for the British with Savannah and Charleston coming under their control by 1780. Cornwallis, the British commander in the south, then planned to move his troops through the Carolina back-country providing what he thought would be a moral booster to loyalists there. Cornwallis' intent was to raise a loyalist militia which, supported by British regulars, would take control of the back country. This proved successful as loyalist militia units were formed and took control throughout the area. By the summer of 1780, British control of South Carolina seemed assured, especially after Cornwallis' defeat of American forces at Camden in August, 1780. Cornwallis was ready to begin his march northward.
             The main objective in the Southern Campaign was to pacify the colonies by using the loyalist and thereby causing minimal cost to the Crown. The British prosecution of the southern strategy shows that they did not have the endurance to endure a long, long-drawn-out pacification program. At the operational and tactical level, Cornwallis became quickly frustrated by the situation in the South, particularly with colonists who would receive training and weapons from the British and then desert to join the rebels. His annoyance culminated with an order to hang every Loyalist who had deserted, imprison all persons that did not support the cause, and use their confiscated property to compensate Loyalist losses.
             Cornwallis's hasty decision to attempt to gain control of North Carolina before he completed pacification of South Carolina further demonstrates the British military's annoyance with pacification operations.


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