He writes that Truman intentionally left the terms of surrender unclear in order to delay the surrender of Japan because he wanted an excuse to use the bombs. Alperovitz states that central issue was "if the war could have been ended by clarifying the terms of surrender and/or allowing the shock of the Russian attack to set in, then no lives would have been lost in an invasion." The lack of regard for saving lives seemed to be a red flag. Stimson had even referenced the bomb as being "the master card" of diplomacy toward Russia. .
Gary Alperovitz's final argument lies in the lack of the support for the bomb after the war. He quotes multiple high ranking officers discussing their sentiments about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many believe that the bombs were unnecessary and that the United States most likely over looked other diplomatic options. Herbert Feis believed that the combination of the Soviet entry and the promise to spare the Emperor might have made the Japanese more likely to surrender at an earlier date. Gary Alperovitz's argument for the reasoning behind Truman's dropping of the bombs is essentially weak. Alperovitz makes one fair claim and it's that the United States wanted to impress Russia with their military prowess by dropping the bombs on Japan. However, he fails to be convincing in other aspects. Alperovitz claims that Japanese would have immediately surrendered upon the Soviet entry into the war. This, however, is simply not true because there are telegrams sent between Minister of Foreign Affairs Togo and Ambassador Sato discussing their war-time plans which included preparations for a two front war against Russia. The Japanese had no intentions of backing down and a Soviet invasion would only empower them. .
Alperovitz's second argument lies in the regrets of World War II military leaders.