.
Tatarstan, for example, strives to sell its oil at world market prices in foreign markets to generate income, .
and in 1993-94, the local governments in Tatarstan and Yakutia sought economic decentralization in .
Russia by refusing to pay federal taxes. Consequently, an agreement reached between the federal .
government and the republics gave the latter what they wanted: increased economic autonomy .
(Drobizheva).
Further inquiry into the agreements with Tartarsan demonstrates the flexibility the Yeltsin regime is .
willing to employ in dealing with possible powder-keg situations. A treaty signed on February 15, 1994 .
attempted to mollify the tensions on both sides. The treaty affirmed Tartarsan right to its own .
"international and economic relations- and, as previously noted, provided substantial autonomy in .
economic issues for Tartarsan. Smoothing over contradictions in each state's constitution, the agreement .
affirms the union between Russia and Tartarsan (Lapidus 107). The treaty with Tartarsan provides a .
possible blueprint for future center-periphery relations. It forebears a evolving and fluid approach that .
should be beneficial in establishing a stable democracy. But in typical Yeltsin contradictory manner, the .
war in Chechnya has demonstrated the worst of the Yeltsin regime.
The conflict between Chechnya and the Russian Federation should not be considered an ethnic conflict. .
The authorities did not even give as a pretext for the invasion the defense of Russian-speaking people. .
Such a pretext would have been unbelievable, in light of the fact that Russian- speaking people suffered .
from the bombing of Grozny at least as much as the native population. The war was connected more with .
the struggle for power in Moscow than with either economic or ethnic factors. The Chechnyan campaign .
was characterized by Yeltsin employing Soviet-era coercive measures. Paternalism, clientelism, and .
military intervention prevailed over legal methods and legal institutions.