Finally, in the end we will suggest that feminist epistemologies strongly challenge not only the theoretical basis of conventional epistemologies, but its application to the methods of investigating the social world as well, offering feminist versions of traditional theories.
Feminists criticised traditional social science, suggesting that it offers a distorted picture of social reality, as it predominantly focuses its attention upon men's experiences. But before taking this point further, it is pertinent to briefly explain what is meant by "epistemology". As L. Stanley and S. Wise suggest (1993), the question of epistemology is fundamental for feminism. They state that an "epistemology" is a framework or theory for specifying the constitution and generation of knowledge about the social world; that is it concerns how to understand the nature of reality:.
A given epistemological framework specifies not only what "knowledge" is and how to recognise it, but who are "knowers" and by what means someone becomes one, and also the means by which competing knowledge-claims are adjudicated and some rejected in favour of another/others.
(page 188).
However, conventional epistemologies (and for the purpose of this paper we will limit our discussion of conventional epistemologies referring to the positivist tradition), exclude in their discussion women. As S. Harding puts forward (1987), "epistemology" answers questions about who can be a "knower" and what tests beliefs must pass in order to be legitimated as knowledge. Yet, .
Traditional epistemologies systematically exclude the possibility that women could be "knowers" or agents of knowledge; they claim that the voice of science is a masculine one .
(page 3). .
She goes on to suggest that traditional philosophy of science suggest that the origin of scientific problems or hypotheses is irrelevant to the "goodness" of the results of the research.