Instead, they were more focused on the immediate, tangible evidence, which to them implied that I should be more thoughtful of their needs. "Why should you get to keep all of them?" one of them asked me. I had several necklaces, they went on to explain, so why couldn't I just give each of them one of mine and keep one for myself? When that didn't work, they tried to show me how similar the necklaces were-I could give them that one and keep the one that looked just like it. When I held my ground, they resorted to bargaining: if they could make it all the way across the monkey bars, then would I consider relinquishing the jewelry? At this point I reminded them that gifts from relatives were very important to people, and that my grandmother would be hurt if she knew that I sometimes gave away the presents that she had given to me. I asked them how they would feel if somebody wanted to take a gift from their grandmothers. I also stressed that I had explained the conditions before I took the jewelry off. After this explanation, they seemed to be more thoughtful, and willing to accept the limitations of our agreement. At the end of the play period, each of them willingly sought me out and gave the necklaces back, asking if they could wear them again next time.
Without guidance, these girls evidently operated within Kohlberg's second stage of moral understanding, the instrumental purpose orientation. At this stage, children are able to understand individualized needs, but believe that each individual should and will act in his/her own best interest (Kohlberg, 1969, cited in Berk, 2000, p. 493). Accordingly, the girls formed the belief that they deserved to have the necklaces based on their personal desires, and believed that my desire to keep the necklaces were purely based on self-interest as well. This level of thinking coincides nicely with the "needs of others" orientation, which is the second stage in Eisenberg's levels of prosocial reasoning.
