Gorgias goes on to say that this because the speeches are "the cause both of freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each man's city" (452d). The shift here is from oratory as a theoretical art to oratory as a practical art. But this shift cannot satisfy Socrates. The question must then be asked, how can a practical art be about the greatest and best of human affairs when they are clearly inferior to the productive arts? Socrates appears less interested in the surface appearance of the effects of oratory than in what oratory really accomplishes in the soul of the audience (453a). If oratory is truly about the "greatest and best human affairs it would have to be considered a kind of theoretic art that produces, through speeches, the most positive change in the soul of the audience" (Kissel 1). .
What kind of change in the soul does oratory cause then? Gorgias replies that it is persuasion. However, we find that oratory is persuasion that provides belief without knowledge. Obviously knowledge is better than true belief, which is greater than false belief, and more knowledge is more admirable than less knowledge. But oratory is based on belief, as Gorgias even admits, and experience reveals that oratory results in both true and false belief (454e). With this understanding, we can say that oratory does not enable the listener's soul to undergo the best possible change, knowledge, but it is actually using its power to create a false belief in the soul of the listener, which is in fact, the worst possible change.
Socrates objects to oratory by saying that mathematics also uses persuasion, but its end result is knowledge, whereas oratory only yields belief. He says that, "oratory is not an art, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of the things its concerned with, so it's unable to give an explanation of any of those things" (Wedgwood 2).
