By September 1950, a stalemate had been reached, with the communists controls the monopoly of air space, Macarthur also now had more ground troops at his disposal than the Korean People Army. He was therefore able to hold off repeated attempts to break through the defensive perimeter. General Macarthur, who almost alone among our military leaders, saw what could be done and what could be won by doing it (Ridgway 163). America was not only fighting against North Korea, but also communists of Russians, and China. European and North American states had been opposed by the totalitarian approach adopted by the Communists in the Soviet Union (Stokesbury 28). The Americans and their associates were hurled southward across the 38th parallel, in a frostbitten, humiliating retreat. The Russians had the greatest armed force in the world, and the United States had the atomic bomb. So, UN forces were establishing positions along the 38th parallel against invading Communist forces, which included Chinese communist troops. .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were fearful of being drawn into a trap that would further Stalin's plan for European conquest, and sent message to Macarthur. General Macarthur set forth his assessment of the situation along with his military proposals. The immediate threat was in the Far East, not Europe, according to Macarthur's view. In order to win political victories, this military threat had to be met. When General Macarthur's arguments for extending the war against china were countered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General angrily demanded "clarification" of the Korean situation. His thinking was "is it the present objective of U.S. political policy to maintain a military position in Korea indefinitely, or for a limited time, or to minimize losses by the evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?" President Truman wrote messages, what Macarthur needed to care about, to Macarthur in an attempt to define the goals and objectives of the Korean campaign.
